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and Industrial Structure
Robert B. Reich t
Economies are like bicycles: the faster they move, the better they main-
tain their balance. Changes in consumer preferences, technologies, inter-
national competition, and the availability of natural resources all require
economies to reallocate capital and labor to newer and more profitable
uses. Societies that redeploy their capital and labor more quickly and effi-
ciently than others are apt to experience faster growth and greater im-
provements in productivity.
Redeployment is particularly difficult in regions that are dependent on
a few large manufacturing firms. In such regions, a substantial portion of
the plant, equipment, and labor force has been dedicated to making cer-
tain products. When markets for these products change radically, capital
and labor are not always able to keep up. The investment required to
redeploy these resources may involve too many workers and too much
plant and equipment, entail too serious risks, and affect too large a por-
tion of the regional economy to be undertaken without substantial sacrifice
and dislocation. Failure to adapt, however, raises the specter of sudden
liquidation, massive loss of jobs, erosion of the local tax base, and area-
wide economic decline.
In some instances, the process that might normally be applied to effect
the necessary redeployment-a bankruptcy under the protection of a court
receiver or even an informal "workout" among creditors-is perceived to
be inadequate. Although such a proceeding might entail concessions from
employees, suppliers, and others with a direct stake in the company, it
does not involve the participation of other "constituents"-manufacturers
in the area, service businesses, communities dependent upon a healthy tax
base-who have an indirect stake in a major firm's continued operations.
Inevitably, politics has interceded. Governments have been called upon to
save jobs by "bailing out" the companies.
In recent years the U.S. government has responded with increasing fre-
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quency to calls for aid to certain large, distressed businesses. Conrail,1
Lockheed,2 Chrysler,' and Continental-Illinois Bank" are-only the most
visible "bailouts." Tariffs, quotas, and tax and regulatory relief are exam-
ples of additional efforts also directed at failing enterprises. These re-
sponses have released a storm of criticism and debate. Some people, re-
coiling from the ad hoc nature of these government actions, have called for
a new government institution to aid troubled industries and companies.'
They typically point to Japan's Ministry of International Trade and In-
dustry (MITI) as a model. 6 Opponents of this approach typically point to
the failures of Britain's National Enterprise Board or similar institutions.7
The debate to date has had a strange, disembodied quality, as if its
participants were arguing over the best way to start up an old machine.
There has been too little discussion of the social context in which eco-
nomic change occurs-the vast network of rules, informal codes, shared
understandings, and values which help determine how economies adapt.
Broad policies cannot be borrowed wholesale from Japan or anywhere
else. But smaller-scale rules and social understandings can be altered, if
only incrementally. By understanding the detailed context of economic
change, we can perhaps begin to face these more subtle possibilities.
The underlying question, then, is not that which many economists and
policy analysts want to ask: "Are bailouts good?" It is a fact of social and
political life that governments inevitably will respond to such calls for
help. This essay, therefore, is not a search for normative judgments, so
much as it is a quest for explanations and hypotheses. What accounts for
the differences in how societies have responded to roughly similar
problems? What are the underlying social realities? Perhaps most impor-
1. The U.S. Government's response to the problems of several failing northeastern and midwest-
ern railroads is embodied in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1982). For
a discussion of Conrail's return to profitability, see Making More Hauling Less, FORTUNE, Aug. 23,
1982, at 7.
2. The bailout of Lockheed Aircraft Corp. was effectuated through the Emergency Loan Guaran-
tee Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1852 (1982).
3. For a discussion of the bailout of the Chrysler Corp., see infra at 180-87.
4. For a discussion of the problems at the Continental Illinois Bank, see, e.g., Wall St. J., July
19, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
5. See, e.g., Eizenstat, Reindustrialization Through Coordination or Chaos?, 2 YALE J. ON REG.
39, 49 (1984); Weil, US. Industrial Policy: A Process in Need of a Federal Industrial Coordination
Board, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 981 (1983).
6. See C. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY,
1925-1975, at 30-32, 305-24 (1982); Weil, supra note 5, at 994-97.
7. Many commentators have warned against the United States following the lead of Great Britain
or other Western European countries in the industrial policy area. See, e.g., Krauss, "Europeanizing"
the U.S Economy: The Enduring Appeal of the Corporatist State, in THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY DE-
BATE 71-90 (C. Johnson ed. 1984) ("European experience shows that the real myth is the notion of
an efficient industrial policy in the first place."); Miller, Walton, Kovacic & Rabkin, Industrial Pol-
icy: Reindustrialization Through Competition or Coordinated Action?, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 23-27
(1984).
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tantly, what can we learn through these comparisons about our own sys-
tem of economic adaptation, and about its limitations and possibilities?
The article is organized into three parts. Part I examines in detail four
large manufacturing companies-AEG-Telefunken, A.G., in West Ger-
many; British Leyland in Great Britain; Toyo Kogyo in Japan; and
Chrysler in the United States-and the "rescues" that were arranged to
bail them out. Each of these major regional employers began to experience
substantial losses at some time during the last decade, but for one reason
or another did not make the investments required to shift their resources
to potentially more profitable uses. Part II analyzes the responses to these
four crises and identifies various underlying patterns in their politics, eco-
nomics, and administration. In each case, the company dismissed employ-
ees, reduced capacity, and shifted some employees and assets to new, more.
productive uses after the bailout was initiated. However, the extent and
pace of such shrinkage and shifting varied. Part III discusses possible ex-
planations for these differences.
I. Cases
The four cases described in this section are not intended to be represen-
tations of how these political-economic systems typically redeploy people
and capital within normal business reorganizations. To the contrary, the
four cases are atypical; they depict systems under stress. These major bus-
iness failures threatened, or were perceived to threaten, entire regions of
the country and, to some extent, the entire national economy. Each case
occurred during a particularly turbulent economic period. Each was per-
ceived as exceptional and generated controversy, debate, complex negotia-
tions, and a search for new solutions. Each case tested the system of nor-
mal political and economic arrangements among finance, labor,
management, and government, and thereby illuminated the detailed rules
and understandings that shape the relationships among these groups.
Typically, we see only the gross movements-the large deals, lawsuits,
statutes, and economic aggregates-and mistake these for the social organ-
ization lying beneath them. It is only when the system is under stress,
when the normal institutional relationships are stretched and tested, that
we can see these underlying patterns more clearly, and understand what is
unique about them and why their uniqueness matters.
The comparisons which are drawn in the following pages are not in-
tended as a controlled experiment, in the sense that differences in how
each of these large-firm crises was handled clearly indicate systemic dif-
ferences among these four political-economic systems and their capacities
to adapt to economic change. No such experiment is possible, because
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there is an almost infinite number of variables which might have affected
public and private approaches to these four cases and their eventual out-
comes. Instead, the comparisons are intended merely to suggest systemic
differences in the approaches and outcomes, and in social organization.
A. AEG-Telefunken, A.G.8
AEG-Telefunken, A.G., was founded in Berlin in 1883. After the Sec-
ond World War, the company was dismembered because ninety percent of
its production facilities were in East Germany. But the company capital-
ized on the consumer boom of the 1950's and 1960's, becoming a giant
conglomerate. It bought up small companies that made washing machines,
ranges, and household appliances. By 1970, it was the second-largest elec-
tronics manufacturing company in West Germany, after Siemens, and the
fifth-largest in Western Europe. It also was responsible for approximately
one percent of the nation's GNP.
In the mid-1970's, AEG's successes began to wane. Japanese manufac-
turers of consumer products started to invade the West German market,
cutting into AEG's sales. The deutschmark rose relative to foreign curren-
cies, making imports even more attractive and AEG's exports even less so.
Moreover, having never fully digested its various acquisitions or imposed
any coherent management structure upon them, the firm seemed incapable
of cutting costs. The many acquisitions also had left the company deeply
in debt. As costs rose, the company dipped into pension reserves, creating
a large deficit in the pension fund.
The crisis came in 1979. Losses for that year mushroomed to $580 mil-
lion. In October, management presented to the company supervisory
board a plan to reduce costs. The plan included elimination of 20,000
jobs, 13,000 to occur in 1980 alone. Labor representatives on the board
strongly opposed the plan.
AEG's labor leaders met in Bonn with Count Lambsdorff, Minister of
Economics in Helmut Schmidt's coalition government, and Hans
Matth~ifer, Minister of Finance. They argued that the government should
invest in the firm, possibly taking over the company, and thereby saving
jobs. Matth6fer, a union member and also a leading member of the Social
Democratic party, was sympathetic, but concerned about the government's
8. This case study is based on data obtained from a wide variety of sources, including company
reports of AEG-Telefunken, interviews, news accounts, and other materials. For the reader interested
in learning more about this case one very useful source is D. Anderson, AEG-Telefunken, A.G. (July
1981) (Harvard Business School Case No. 1-381-187). For the purposes of this case and the cases
which follow (see infra notes 16, 23, and 32), all foreign currencies have been converted into
equivalent dollar values at the exchange rate applicable when the transaction discussed occurred.
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mounting deficits. Lambsdorff, a Free Democrat and economic conserva-
tive, opposed the plan. There was no agreement on a remedy for AEG's
problems.
The Dresdner Bank, AEG's lead bank and the second largest bank in
West Germany, then took the initiative. In December, Dr. Hans Frider-
ichs, chief executive of Dresdner and a director of AEG's supervisory
board, hosted a meeting of sixty-six of West Germany's most powerful
business and financial leaders at the bank's headquarters in Frankfurt.
Friderichs' message was clear: AEG needed financial help. If the help did
not come from the banks, insurance companies, and other industrial giants
there assembled, it would have to come from the government. If help came
from the government, it would come with strings, and the strings would
be tied to organized labor, giving it more power within management. One
managing director of the Dresdner Bank put the matter bluntly: "Let's
face it, either we are going to provide the subsidy or the State will, and if
the State does then the State will want control . . . and there are certain
voices in our political system that will be happy to ease the way. '
The assembled financiers and industrialists also were aware of mount-
ing public concern about the powerful role banks played in the West Ger-
man economy.1" The government was then considering legislation to limit
the amount of equity any bank could hold in a given company. The bank-
ers feared that an admission that they could not handle the crisis without
state intervention would raise serious questions about why they should
enjoy such sweeping power in corporate boardrooms. 1
The meeting produced a plan to aid AEG. Under the plan, a consor-
tium of twenty-four banks would provide the company with the
equivalent of $376.2 million in new equity, bringing the banks' combined
holdings to around sixty-five percent of the firm's outstanding shares. The
banks also would reschedule about $1.16 billion of the company's long-
term debt and some $700 million in short and medium-term debt. Insur-
ance companies would subscribe to $90 million in unsecured bonds at a
rate one percent below that on long-term government bonds; other large
industrial firms would subscribe to about $125 million in similar bonds.
In addition, shareholders would be asked to approve a two-thirds reduc-
tion in the nominal value of the company's stock. The company, in turn,
would reduce its West German work force by ten percent in 1980, and
would replace its chief executive with Heinz Diirr.
9. D. Anderson, supra note 8, at 15.
10. See id., at 12-15. For a discussion of the role German banks traditionally play in the econ-
omy, see infra at 207-09.
11. Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1979, at 16, col. 3.
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The plan proved to be inadequate and losses continued to mount. In
1981, the firm lost $260 million on sales of $6.2 billion. Nearly the same
results befell the firm in 1982. Accumulated debt rose to $3.2 billion. Eq-
uity shrunk to ten percent of indebtedness. The 1981 recession, coupled
with high interest rates, was partly to blame; the firm was still struggling
to repay loans for its 1960's expansion.
Once again, the Dresdner Bank took the initiative. It sought to get the
group of lenders to reschedule the existing debt and provide new loans.
This time, however, the government's help would be needed. The com-
pany's debt was now too large, and its future too precarious, to rely any
longer on a private-sector solution.
In the spring of 1982, Hans Friderichs and Heinz Diirr met with
Count Lambsdorff and the new finance minister, Manfred Lahnstein.
The recession had pushed unemployment up to more than seven percent
from an average rate of 3.5% between 1977 and 1980. Prospective job
losses were on everyone's mind. Friderichs and Dilrr proposed that the
government become involved in the company's plight. The banks would
write off the firm's 1982 debt repayments of $105 million, and would
provide new loans up to $800 million. But the government would have to
guarantee to repay the loans if the firm went into bankruptcy. Labor lead-
ers met separately with the government officials to ask for government
assistance, but argued, as they had three years before, that in return the
government should obtain an ownership interest in the company.
A few months later the government announced its decision. It would
immediately provide AEG with loan guarantees equivalent to $239 mil-
lion for the purpose of financing export sales, on condition that the banks
provide $100 million in new loans. Additional loan guarantees would be
made available to the company on the condition that an independent audit
showed that the firm was still viable and could survive without aid in two
or three years' time. Lambsdorff made it clear, however, that any solution
to the company's problems was primarily the responsibility of the com-
pany and of West German industry, not of the state.
12
AEG then dropped the other shoe. On August 9, 1982, after an emer-
gency meeting of AEG's supervisory board, the firm announced that it
had run out of cash, that its losses for the year could be as much as $200
million, and that it would therefore seek reorganization under a court pro-
ceeding known as Vergleich, a type of partial bankruptcy under which
sixty to sixty-five percent of a company's debt can be written off so long as
the company's reorganization plan is approved by a majority of creditors
12. Wall St. J., July 15, 1982, at 34, coll.
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holding among them at least seventy-five percent of the debt."3 If success-
ful, the reorganization would wipe the company's slate clean of more than
$2 billion of debt. Reorganization would have the added advantage of
eliminating $520 million of unfunded pension liabilities, which would be
taken over by the Pension Security Association, a semi-public corporation
established in the early 1970's to insure the pensions of employees of in-
solvent companies. In addition to seeking reorganization, the company an-
nounced that 20,000 employees would be laid off.
The announcements shocked the West German financial community
and labor unions. Labor leaders again called upon the government to buy
the company in order to stop job losses. The government held firm, al-
though Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's Social Democrats were about to face
an important contest with the Christian Democrats in the State of Hesse,
in which labor support was crucial. The conservative Free Democrats, on
whom Schmidt depended to maintain his increasingly fragile coalition-
government, opposed state intervention. The unions were philosophical.
"The times have changed," stated Eugen Loderer, a chief of the labor
union, IG Metall. "A cave-in has occurred that cannot be handled in the
usual bombastic way. Union policy must accept the realities.'
1 4
Several weeks later the government formally agreed to guarantee up to
$440 million of new loans to the firm. The independent audit commis-
sioned by the government had concluded that the firm had a good chance
of survival so long as the court-supervised settlement of AEG's current
debts was approved, the new loans were provided, and the company con-
tinued to slim down. Half of the loan guarantees would come from indi-
vidual state governments, in proportion to their share of AEG's work
force. In addition, certain states agreed to provide low-interest loans. For
example, the State of Hesse would grant loans of up to $400,000 at subsi-
dized rates to any AEG supplier headquartered within the state.
AEG's creditors approved the reorganization plan. The banks then
came up with more than $800 million of new loans, half of which were
guaranteed by the government. The crisis seemed to be over. Indeed, in
1983, AEG appeared to be back on a relatively even keel. Its stock price
had rebounded to around $47 a share, up from a low of around $12 in
1979. Its worldwide payroll was down to 76,500 people-60,000 of them
in West Germany. Although the company "celebrated" its hundredth
birthday with losses of just under $333 million for 1982, it cut its losses to
13. Vergleichsordnung §§ 7, 20, 73, 74, 1935 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] I 321 (W. Ger.).
14. Labor is Bracing for AEG's Collapse, BUS. WK., Sept. 6, 1982, at 42, 43.
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less than $13 million in 1983, and it was expected to approach the break-
even point in 1984.1"
B. British Leyland&6
British Leyland (BL) was created in 1968 when Harold Wilson's La-
bour government decided that the only way to preserve a strong British
automobile industry that could compete worldwide was to merge the two
remaining British-owned automobile companies, British Motor Company
and Leyland Motor Company, into a larger-scale enterprise. The govern-
ment, therefore, offered funds to induce the change.
The merger occurred on paper only. The two companies, which them-
selves resulted from more than thirty mergers over the years, remained
fragmented. There were more than seventy plants scattered around Eng-
land, many too small to achieve economies of scale. More than 200,000
employees were divided among eight divisions, seventeen different unions,
and 246 bargaining units. In 1970, five million work-hours were lost to
strikes and work stoppages; by 1972, the loss had reached ten million
work-hours. Fierce inter-union rivalries also existed because many of the
companies that had been merged into BL had been rivals for decades.
According to one industry executive, "[t]he people at Longbridge [where
Austins were made] wouldn't talk to -the people at Cowley [the Morris
plant], and the snobs at Jaguar wouldn't speak to any of them.""'
Despite these problems, BL managed during the early 1970's to coast
along on rising automobile sales generated largely by the government's
decision to lift restrictive credit and tax measures. BL sold all the cars and
commercial vehicles it could produce, though profit margins were extraor-
dinarily low: in 1973, it sold 1.2 million cars, but earned the equivalent of
$66 million on $3.8 billion of sales (a paltry 1.7%).
Then came the oil crisis and soaring inflation of the mid-1970's. BL's
costs were so high relative to other auto companies and its quality so poor,
that it could not compete. It began to lose money. The Austin 1300 sedan
became one of the few cars ever to be awarded a "silver lemon" by the
West German Automobile Club, a dubious honor bestowed for "horrible"
mechanical faults. BL's share of the British market tumbled from forty-
15. German Trib., Jan. 8, 1984, at 7, col. 1.
16. The sources for this case study, as for the study of AEG, are too numerous to list comprehen-
sively. See generally G. Lodge, British Leyland: The Ryder Report (Feb. 1982) (Harvard Business
School Case No. 9-376-052); D. RYDER, R. CLARK, S. GILLEN, F. MCWHIRTER & C. URWIN, BRITISH
LEYLAND: THE NEXT DECADE (1975) (abridged version of a report presented to the Secretary of State
for Industry by a Team of Inquiry led by Sir Don Ryder) [hereinafter cited as RYDER REPORT];
BRITISH LEYLAND, 1974 REPORT AND ACCOUNTS (1975).
17. Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
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five percent, just prior to the 1968 merger, to thirty-three percent in 1974;
its share of the continental European market declined from ten to seven
percent.
In July 1974, BL executives met with the firm's principal bank-
ers-Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, and National Westminster-to ask them
to lend the company the equivalent of $1.2 billion for new investment over
the next six years. The company already had borrowed $315 million. The
banks, however, were unwilling to extend any more loans. By September,
BL's cash position was deteriorating quickly. Losses for the fiscal year
amounted to $46.2 million. With its share capital valued at only $360
million, the company had a worrisome debt-to-equity ratio of approxi-
mately one-to-one.
The crisis was deepening. In a few months, BL would not be able to
pay its bills. BL executives and their bankers met in late November with
Tony Benn, Secretary of State for Industry in the Wilson government. On
December 6, 1974, Benn announced that the government would seek Par-
liament's approval for public aid to the company, perhaps including some
degree of public ownership. He immediately appointed a team of business
and labor leaders, under the direction of Sir Don Ryder, a noted industri-
alist, to assess both BL's present situation and its future prospects, and
report back to Parliament.
The Ryder Report, 8 issued on March 26, 1975, blamed BL's troubles
on inadequate capital investment, poor labor-management relations, and
inefficiently organized production. According to the report, however, the
situation was not hopeless: the company could become profitable again
with an infusion over the next seven years of the equivalent of $6.2 billion
for new investment. Half of this money would come from the government;
the other half would be generated internally. Through its purchase of old
and new shares, the government would own a majority of the company. In
addition, the report proposed the establishment of a new structure of "in-
dustrial democracy" within the company, in order to take advantage of the
ideas and enthusiasm of the work force and overcome hostilities. It also
suggested reorganizing the company into four separate profit centers with
responsibility, respectively, for cars, trucks and buses, international sales,
and other special products.
On April 24, 1975, Prime Minister Harold Wilson, the leader of the
Labour Party, described the government's plan to rescue BL to a packed
and somber House of Commons. Wilson explained that the company's
importance to the national economy necessitated such a vast investment.1 "
18. RYDER REPORT, supra note 16.
19. N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1975, at 45, col. 1. See also RYDER REPORT, supra note 16, at 3
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After a bitter and acrimonious debate, Parliament agreed."0 BL an-
nounced in a letter to its shareholders that it had accepted the plan. The
company's managing director resigned and was replaced with a new chief
executive. BL's aged chairman, Lord Stokes, was given the figurehead po-
sition of president, and a new chairman was installed.
The government immediately provided BL with the equivalent of $426
million of new equity capital; the rest would come in stages, as BL met
certain performance benchmarks. The National Enterprise Board (NEB),
a semi-independent government agency, then headed by Sir Don Ryder,
would provide these funds. The Board soon began working with BL's
new management, restructuring the company along the lines that had
been suggested in the Ryder Report.
Labor disputes increased as a result of these efforts. Ryder's plan for
industrial democracy involved a complex hierarchy of plant committees,
divisional committees, and senior councils. Shop stewards, who had the
greatest power under the old arrangement, feared that the new system
would create a rival channel of communication. A compromise was
reached which gave the shop stewards responsibility for putting forth a
slate of worker delegates to the committees and councils.
There were other problems. Middle managers felt excluded from the
process, while senior managers had all they could do to attend the 760
weekly meetings of the various groups: Confidential company information
leaked out to the press. Rank-and-file workers continued to engage in
wildcat strikes. There were stoppages at the Triumph works over track
speed, at Bathgate over pay, at Coventry's Jaguar plant over a manage-
ment decision to install a new paint shop at Castle Bromwich-which the
workers feared would jeopardize the independence of Jaguar. Moreover,
workers continued to complain about salaries and responsibilities, as well
as about other company policies.
Productivity in 1977 was lower than in the crisis year of 1974. The
company estimated that strikes and work stoppages reduced production by
225,000 vehicles. Losses amounted to the equivalent of $110.5 million.
The company sold 785,000 vehicles (down from 1.2 million in 1973), and
BL's share of the British automobile market slipped to twenty-three per-
cent (from thirty-three percent at the time of the Ryder Report). The
National Enterprise Board continued to hand out money, but the govern-
ment threatened to review and revise the entire Ryder plan.
("[V]ehicle production is the kind of industry which ought to remain an essential part of the UK's
economic base. We believe, therefore, that BL should remain a major vehicle producer, although this
means that urgent action must be taken to remedy the weaknesses which at present prevent it from
competing effectively in world markets.").
20. 892 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1542 (1975). See also infra note 64.
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A turning point of sorts came in the fall of 1977, when Leslie Murphy
took over from Don Ryder at the NEB. Among Murphy's first acts was to
dismiss BL's chief executive and its chairman. The NEB appointed
Michael Edwardes to both positions. As chief executive of Chloride
Group, Britain's largest battery maker, Edwardes had earned something
of a "whiz kid" reputation; he had also been one of the first members of
the NEB.
Edwardes immediately set out to reduce BL to profitable size. He re-
vised the firm's production targets downward to 800,000 vehicles and
twenty-five percent of the British market, and announced the need for a
corresponding cut in employment. He offered workers bonuses of up to
$3000 if they would leave the company voluntarily. Simultaneously,
Edwardes took a tough line with the unions. He closed the Speke plant in
Liverpool, which had been plagued by work stoppages and poor work-
manship, thereby laying off 3000 workers. When the machinists at
Scotland's Bathgate truck and tractor factory went out on strike,
Edwardes announced a $70 million cut in planned investment at the
plant.
By late 1979, as Margaret Thatcher moved into Downing Street and
the Conservatives took over the reigns of government, BL's share of the
British auto market had fallen for the first time to under twenty percent.
Only 625,000 vehicles were manufactured, down from 785,000 in 1977,
and 1.2 million in 1973. The company had slimmed: it now employed
165,000 people (down from 211,000 in 1975). With under two percent of
the world's automobile market, BL was the smallest full-range automobile
manufacturer on the globe. Losses for the fiscal year ending in September
were the equivalent of $242 million, double the losses for 1977 and almost
four times the losses for the crisis year of 1974. All told, the Labour gov-
ernment had invested more than $1 billion and lent the company more
than $500 million. 1
It was now the Tories' turn to deal with BL's problems. Union leaders
met with Keith Joseph, the new Secretary of State for Industry, and ar-
gued for more government assistance. Joseph opposed generous conces-
sions to BL. Edwardes announced that substantial new public investment
was needed both to launch new models and to encourage voluntary lay-
offs. He warned that, without the funds, BL would be forced into bank-
ruptcy and he would resign. He also unveiled a plan to scale back BL still
further by closing thirteen more plants and cutting an additional 25,000
21. The poor performance could no longer be blamed entirely on the company. Sales of North Sea
oil had strengthened the pound, thereby making all British exports less attractive. At the same time,
higher oil prices dampened demand for larger cars, on which BL made its highest profits.
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workers from the payroll. Joseph relented. The Conservatives agreed to
provide the equivalent of an additional $660 million in cash.
However, this new infusion of capital did not help. Although 1979 had
been a bad year for BL, 1980 was even worse. Losses were $1.2 billion on
sales of $6.5 billion. The world auto industry was generally in a slump.
BL had invested a substantial portion of the government's money in devel-
oping new models, but they were still months away from appearing in
showrooms. In the meantime, new cash was needed desperately. After a
stormy meeting of the Cabinet in February 1981, Joseph announced that
the government would provide BL with another cash infusion-this one
the equivalent of $1.2 billion. One ministerial colleague commented dryly:
"There's a job waiting for Sir Keith Joseph in Oxford Street. He's been
practicing the role of Father Christmas."22
The rest of the story is more upbeat. Losses for 1981 were slightly less
than the year before. By 1982, losses had been reduced to $275 million
and in 1983 the company nearly broke even. Certain divisions, like Land
Rover and Jaguar, actually turned a profit. The new models were enor-
mously successful. The Metro became Britain's most popular compact.
The Maestro, a 5-door hatchback, was introduced to much acclaim in
early 1983. News reports featured Mrs. Thatcher at the wheel, proudly
motoring up and down Downing Street for the cameras. BL's share of the
British market bounced back almost to twenty percent. Productivity was
up and the company was now considerably leaner. Capacity had been
reduced to roughly a half-million vehicles; employment was down to
100,000. Industry observers predicted a rosy future.
C. Toyo Kogyo
28
Toyo Kogyo, founded in 1920 in Hiroshima, began as a manufacturer
of cork products. The company's first automobile, introduced in 1931, was
little more' than a wagon attached to a motorcycle. During the Second
World War the company produced rifles, rock drills, and gauges to mea-
sure the accuracy of precision-engineering instruments. When the United
States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, Toyo
Koygo's factory and its 10,000 workers were shielded by a small hill sepa-
rating them from the rest of the city.
Tsunjei Matsuda, son of the company's founder, took over as president
22. BL: It's the Thought that Counts, ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 1981, at 48.
23. This case study is based on data obtained from a wide variety of sources including company
reports of Toyo Kogyo, interviews, news accounts, and other materials. See, e.g., The Turnaround at
Mazda-Is there a lesson for Chrysler?, L.A. Times, Oct. 25, 1981, § 5, at 1, col. 5; TOYO KOGYO,
SUMMARY OF TOYO KOGYO (1983).
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in 1951. The company became one of Japan's leading truck makers under
the brand name "Mazda," a contraction of Matsuda. Matsuda was intent
on using Toyo Kogyo's expertise in engineering to compete with the
much-larger Toyota and Nissan automobile companies. In 1960, the firm
produced its first "real" car, a tiny sixteen horsepower two-seater.
Soon thereafter Toyo Kogyo turned for help to the Sumitomo Bank,
one of Japan's largest banks. Until that time Toyo Kogyo's lead bank had
been the Hiroshima Bank, but the firm was now sufficiently large that it
needed the backing of a larger financial institution. The new relationship
proved auspicious. Shozo Hotta, the chairman of Sumitomo Bank, intro-
duced Matsuda to West Germany's Konrad Adenauer, and Adenauer in
turn arranged for Toyo Kogyo to obtain from Audi-Wankel a license to
produce a rotary engine which Audi engineers had just designed.
By 1967, Toyo Kogyo was the world's only commercial manufacturer
of cars equipped with rotary engines. The cars were wildly successful:
rotary engines produced relatively little pollution (an important advan-
tage, as the Japanese government progressively tightened pollution-control
standards in the 1970's), were snappy and responsive, and were novel.
Before introducing rotary engine models, Toyo Kogyo produced about
150,000 cars and trucks a year; after it began to concentrate on rotary
engines, production increased dramatically. By 1973, Toyo Kogyo was
building 740,000 vehicles annually and had become Japan's third largest
automaker. Its export sales, mostly to the United States, were booming. It
was expanding its facilities to accommodate annual production of one mil-
lion vehicles. Its workforce also expanded rapidly, reaching 37,000 by
1973-4.5% of the working population of Hiroshima prefecture. If com-
ponent suppliers are included in the calculation, 7.4% of total jobs in the
prefecture derived from Toyo Kogyo, one-quarter of the total manufactur-
ing employment. Hiroshima's other major industry, shipbuilding, was in
steep decline, so that the regional economy was growing even more depen-
dent on Toyo Kogyo.
Toyo Kogyo's success was abruptly shattered by the oil crisis of the
mid-1970's. With all their advantages, rotary engines had one telling dis-
advantage: they were inefficient. According to a 1974 report of the U.S.
Environmental .Protection Agency, Mazdas with rotary engines got only
ten miles per gallon in city driving.24 Rapidly rising oil prices therefore
meant rapidly falling sales. In 1974, U.S. sales of Mazdas declined by
more than 43,000 cars, and Japanese sales also plummeted. Inventories
bulged.
24. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 1974 GAS MILEAGE GUIDE FOR CAR BUYERS:
FUEL ECONOMY TEST RESULTS FOR AUTOMOBILES AND LIGHT-DUTY TRUCKS 4-5 (1974).
Yale Journal on Regulation
Nevertheless, throughout 1974 Kohei Matsuda, the president of the
firm and grandson of the founder, continued to make rosy projections.
Late in the year he called a press conference to announce that a new
rotary engine with forty percent better fuel efficiency would be in produc-
tion before the end of 1975. (In fact, it took Toyo Kogyo engineers six
more years to achieve this feat.) Despite declining sales, Matsuda refused
to cut production, with the result that by the end of 1974 the company
was left with 126,000 unsold cars. Not surprisingly, the company's per-
formance in 1974 was a disaster; it lost the equivalent of more than $75
million on $2 billion of sales. The firm had sunk even more deeply into
debt than normal for debt-laden Japanese firms. By the end of 1974, the
firm's bank indebtedness had grown to $1.5 billion, and its debt-equity
ratio had mushroomed to four-to-one.
Sumitomo Bank officials were not standing idly by. They suggested to
Kohei Matsuda that the firm cut production and stop its expansion pro-
gram, but Matsuda would not listen. Meanwhile, Toyo Kogyo dealers
from around Japan expressed their concerns about the company to bank
officials. The dealers' lack of confidence, coupled with Matsuda's intransi-
gence and the rapidly deteriorating position of the firm, forced the bank's
hand.
In October 1974, the bank sent two of its senior officers to Toyo Kogyo
to join the firm's management temporarily. This action was intended to
"strengthen the company's financing operations [and] prepare for a possi-
ble deterioration in the company's business."25 The Sumitomo officers
took charge of the biggest trouble spots: financing the ballooning invento-
ries of unsold Mazdas in the United States, and projecting the firm's per-
formance over the next year or two. These emissaries were followed by
others. In all, over the next two years, Sumitomo Bank and Sumitomo
Trust Company placed eleven of their top-level executives in key positions
within Toyo Kogyo. These included Tsutomu Murai, managing director
of the bank, who took over as executive vice president of the automaker.
Murai described the changeover bluntly: "For now, we're an army of oc-
cupation. Active intervention is unavoidable." 6
The Sumitomo rescue team acted quickly. Kohei Matsuda, Toyo
Kogyo's president, was made chairman of the company without any oper-
ating duties. Two-thirds of the company's section chiefs were shifted to
new positions. Costs were slashed in all areas. Production was cut back,
expansion plans were dropped, $54 million in stock and real estate was
sold off, dividends were reduced by twenty percent for three years, hiring
25. Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1974, at 11, col. 1.
26. Where is Toyo Kogyo Going?, TOYO KEIZAI [ORIENTAL ECONOMIST], Feb. 14, 1976.
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of new assembly workers was halted for four years, pay levels were frozen
for all managers at the rank of section chief or above (about four percent
of the total payroll), directors' salaries were cut and bonuses ended for
three years, and the union accepted pay raises lower than those received
by auto workers at other automobile companies.
One major cost remained. With production cut, the company no longer
needed one-quarter of its workforce. Ten thousand employees were now
redundant. Rather than lay off the workers, the new Toyo Kogyo manag-
ers devised a scheme for training them as auto salesmen and sending them
to Mazda dealers around Japan to sell the excess cars door-to-door. About
5000 employees, mostly from the shop floor, took part in the plan between
1975 and 1980. The other 5000 employees gradually retired from the firm
over the five years. Each participating employee spent two years in sales
work before returning to his factory job. Most were assigned to Tokyo
and Osaka, hundreds of miles north of Hiroshima. The company paid
each participant his incidental expenses, provided a supplemental wage in
order to match his factory salary, and housed him in company-owned
dormitories.
Mazda dealers were delighted to have the extra help. It is common in
Japan to sell automobiles door-to-door, and a larger sales force means
more sales. The displaced workers, however, were less enthusiastic. The
two-year shift often meant absence from family and friends. Many found
the transition from production to sales to be difficult. Hayato Ichihara,
who later became president of the company's union, explained why work-
ers went along: "[W]e feared that if we didn't accept the proposal the
company would demand we accept dismissals of workers in exchange for
wage increases. And union members did understand that there were too
many workers for the work that existed." 7
Simultaneously with their cost-cutting efforts, Toyo Kogyo's new man-
agers shifted the firm's competitive strategy. Rather than compete solely
on the basis of engineering, the company henceforth would compete on the
strength of its sales organization and its low costs. But the new managers
also knew that Toyo Kogyo's future would depend on new models. The
company continued to hire engineers and pour money into developing cars
both with conventional piston engines and with rotaries. Between 1977
and 1980 Toyo Kogyo introduced five new models, including a fuel-
efficient rotary.
Sumitomo Bank financed much of this transition and arranged financ-
ing for the rest. By 1976, when Toyo Kogyo's accumulated debt reached
the equivalent of $1.6 billion, the bank's share reached $256 million, six-
27. Hard Times Make Tenjin a Top Auto Salesman, L.A. Times, Oct. 25, 1981, § 5, at 1. col. 3.
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teen percent of the total. The following year it boosted its lending by
$70.9 million, to a peak of $327 million. When the other sixty banks and
insurance companies which had lent money to Toyo Kogyo threatened to
cut off future credit, Ichiro Isoda (later president of Sumitomo Bank and
then an executive in charge of the Toyo Kogyo account) called the other
lenders to a meeting at Sumitomo's headquarters in Osaka and assured
them that regardless of what happened to Toyo Kogyo in the future, the
Sumitomo Bank would "stand by the company to the end" and would be
making additional loans in the near future.28 Isoda then asked the other
lenders not to desert Toyo Kogyo either, and promised them that all credi-
tors would share equally in repayment of any new loans. In the end, only
a few of the lenders came forth with additional loans, but none called in
the loans then outstanding.
Sumitomo Bank also twisted arms. Members of the Sumitomo
keiretsu29 provided additional loans. They bought most of the $54 million
in stocks and real estate which Toyo Kogyo was forced to sell. They also
purchased large numbers of Mazdas from Toyo Kogyo's bloated invento-
ries. Sumitomo Bank branch offices around Japan steered bank customers
to Mazda dealers. The bank also provided a large loan to C. Itoh, a major
trading company which was not a member of the keiretsu, on condition
that Itoh take over Toyo Kogyo's sales organization in the eastern United
States and purchase its inventory of 10,000 unsold cars. Finally, in 1979
the bank arranged for Ford Motor Company to purchase twenty-five per-
cent of the outstanding shares of Toyo Kogyo, a move which dramatically
improved Toyo Kogyo's cash position.
Additional help came from the city of Hiroshima. Business leaders
formed an association called a Kyoshinkai ("Home Heart Group") to
promote Toyo Kogyo sales in the region. The prefectural government co-
operated by enacting a new and far stricter pollution-control law. Because
rotary engines produced less pollution than conventional engines, this
28. Interview with Satoshi Yamada, General Manager of Sumitomo Bank, in Osaka, Japan
(Sept. 16, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Yamada Interview].
29. Keiretsu, groups of companies united by stock ownership and financial support, are the post-
war descendants of the great zaibatsu, whose hand in the Japanese war effort led to their dissolution
during the American occupation after World War II. The four most famous pre-war
zaibatsu-Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda-included firms in every sector of the economy
from heavy industry to banks, each bearing the zaibatsu's name and all centered around a single
holding company exercising strict control. Unlike the zaibatsu, the keiretsu is centered around a large
bank which exercises considerable influence over the keiretsu's members. The power of this lead bank
is assured not only by its debt and equity 'arrangements with the firms in the keiretsu, but also by the
interlocking financial and operating linkages among the firms and by the efforts of the group's trading
company. See R. CAVES & M. UEKUSA, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN JAPAN 62-68 (1976); see also
K. HAITANI, THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC SYSTEM 120-25 (1976). The main role of the lead bank
within a keiretsu is to guarantee a member's debt and thereby permit heavy leveraging of investment.
C. JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 206.
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change had the effect of reducing the pollution tax on rotary-engine vehi-
cles relative to the tax on conventional engine models. These efforts served
to raise Toyo Kogyo's share of the regional market from twenty to thirty-
five percent, and further reduced inventories.
The national government did not intervene directly, but its presence
was felt. From the beginning Sumitomo Bank officials understood that the
Ministry of Finance was vitally concerned about the future of the com-
pany and that the central bank would make every effort to cooperate. The
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) at first considered
merging Toyo Kogyo with Mitsubishi or Honda. However, in a widely
circulated speech Tomatsu Yoguro, vice-minister of MITI, announced
that MITI would not look favorably upon a merger. MITI also en-
couraged Toyo Kogyo's large suppliers, such as Mitsubishi Steel, to con-
tinue their dealings on normal terms. The Ministry of Finance en-
couraged major banking institutions, like the Industrial Bank of Japan
and the Long-term Credit Bank, to provide Toyo Kogyo with additional
credit. In 1979, MITI obligingly cleared away legal hurdles for Ford's
purchase of one-quarter of Toyo Kogyo.
Toyo Kogyo's new models were successful and, because they could all
be produced on the same production line at the same time, the company
had the flexibility to vary its output while fully utilizing its plant and
equipment. This new organization of production fueled productivity im-
provements, from nineteen cars a year per worker in 1973 to forty-three
cars in 1980.
By 1980 the company was profitable once again. Its debt had been re-
duced to the equivalent of $943.5 million, and the infusion of new equity
from Ford had reduced its debt-to-equity ratio to under two-to-one. It
sold more than one million vehicles, slipping past Chrysler to become the
world's ninth-largest auto maker.
Successes continued. Export sales ballooned. Ford began to rely on
Toyo Kogyo's supply of subcompacts and components. In 1983, its most
popular export model, the Mazda 626, was named United States "Import
Car of the Year" by Motor Trend magazine."0 That year the company
sold 1.2 million vehicles, earning the equivalent of $91.4 million on $4.3
billion of sales. In the fall of 1983, looking back on nine years of rebuild-
ing the company, Satoshi Yamada, general manager of Sumitomo Bank's
credit department and one of the bank executives who had spent time at
Toyo Kogyo, said: "[I]t was a difficult period. Many people sacrificed. We
didn't know how it would come out in the end. We are very pleased."3"
30. MOTOR TREND, Apr. 1983, at 9.
31. Yamada Interview, supra note 28.
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D. Chrysler3 2
The Chrysler story began in 1922 when several bankers, worried about
their outstanding loans to the faltering Maxwell Motor Company, per-
suaded Walter P. Chrysler to take over management of the auto company.
The company had expanded too rapidly and haphazardly during the First
World War and the short boom following it. It had been unprepared for
intense competition from other upstart automakers and a decline in de-
mand when the market returned to normal. Chrysler persuaded the bank-
ers to extend new loans to Maxwell and forgive much of the old debt in
exchange for stock and stock options. He also raised more funds by hur-
riedly redesigning Maxwell's old line of cars and slashing the price. In
1924, he unveiled a new car with a high-compression engine capable of
extraordinarily quick starts. More than 32,000 Chryslers were sold that
year at a profit of over $4 million, and the name of the company was
changed to the Chrysler Corporation. The company continued to flourish,
purchasing Dodge in 1928. It weathered the Depression better than most
businesses.
Chrysler's performance after the Second World War was less impres-
sive. Walter Chrysler was gone. The company was slow to ready new
models to meet the postwar boom; its historic strength lay in engineering
rather than in marketing and styling, which were now the keys to captur-
ing Americans' growing demand for autos. It gained twenty-two percent
of the U.S. automobile market in 1951, but then entered a long downward
trend that would take its share below ten percent in 1962. It bounced back
a bit in the mid-1960's under the direction of Lynn Townsend, who em-
phasized design and sales. Townsend also launched the firm on an ambi-
tious expansion program which drained the firm of cash and made it vul-
nerable to sudden changes in demand.
Chrysler's first brush with bankruptcy came in 1970, when it lost $27
million in the first quarter and plunged deeply into debt. The Penn Cen-
tral bankruptcy that year made investors wary of any company with
heavy debt and current losses. A rescue mission was mounted by John
McGillicuddy, then a vice-chairman of Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., Chrysler's lead bank. He organized a syndicate of banks to pump
$180 million into Chrysler's critical financial subsidiary, which in turn
continued to provide loans to car buyers. The firm got a second wind.
However, the oil shock and the 1974 recession caused auto sales to
plummet. Chrysler went into a tailspin. Lynn Townsend was replaced by
32. The data on which this case is based were obtained from company reports, interviews and
news accounts. A much more detailed version of this study appears in R. REICH & J. DONAHUE, NEW
DEALS: THE CHRYSLER REVIVAL AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM (1985).
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John Riccardo, whose strategy was basically to keep the company solvent
by selling off the foreign subsidiaries that Townsend had created and clos-
ing marginal factories around the United States. Eventually, even these
cuts proved to be insufficient. In 1978, the firm lost $204.6 million on
under $13 billion in sales.
By the summer of 1979, Chrysler's lenders had become extremely wor-
ried. The firm by now owed more than $1 billion to almost 400 separate
financial institutions spread around the globe. Chrysler needed more
loans, but its creditors were in no mood to accommodate. McGillicuddy,
now chairman of Manufacturers Hanover, persuaded Chrysler to host a
meeting of its major creditors to allay their fears. The meeting was held at
Chrysler's headquarters; one participant described it as little more than a
pep rally, in which no new information was forthcoming but Chrysler
executives expressed determination and confidence." The bankers agreed
to keep available to Chrysler $750 million in short term credit, but
warned that they could not arrange additional funding. Their fears and
warnings mounted in July after Riccardo announced Chrysler's perform-
ance for the second quarter: the company had suffered a loss of $207 mil-
lion on sales of $3 billion. This loss was worse than the total losses for
1978.
Politicians also were becoming worried. Chrysler had closed a number
of plants in 1978 and more closings seemed imminent. The firm directly
employed 140,000 people, and hundreds of thousands more worked for
suppliers. Most of the workers were concentrated around the Great
Lakes. Riccardo hoped that the new Democratic administration would be
sympathetic to Chrysler's problems and the hardships that would result
from massive layoffs. Since President Carter's election, Riccardo had
made repeated trips to Washington, seeking financial assistance to mod-
ernize certain plants and relief from fuel efficiency and environmental reg-
ulations. At first, his requests fell on deaf ears. As the company's position
deteriorated, however, senators and representatives from affected states be-
came increasingly active. In June 1979, Riccardo met with administration
officials to seek legislation that would permit the company to convert its
mounting tax losses into a $1 billion cash advance, but the Carter Admin-
istration still was not receptive. The Treasury Department feared that
any such plan would pervert the tax code and open the floodgates to other
companies in dire straits. Nevertheless, Treasury officials organized a task
force to gather information on Chrysler and devise alternatives.
By August, the Carter Administration had decided to help Chrysler. It
33. Interview with officials of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (names withheld by request), in
New York City (Jan. 10, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Manufacturers Hanover Interview].
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was likely that Congress would act even if the Administration did not. In
addition, Douglas Fraser, president of the United Auto Workers Union,
and Coleman Young, Mayor of Detroit, had impressed upon the Presi-
dent and his immediate staff the importance of maintaining Chrysler jobs.
With an election little more than one year away, their advice struck a
responsive chord. On August 9, 1979, G. William Miller, the newly-
appointed Secretary of the Treasury, met with Chrysler's board of direc-
tors. He told them that the administration would support neither the tax
plan nor regulatory relief, but might be persuaded to introduce legislation
guaranteeing up to $750 million in new loans if the company came up
with an acceptable restructuring plan, including financial concessions
from lenders, employees, dealers, and state governments.3 4 Another re-
quirement-well understood, although unstated-was that John Riccardo
would step down as chairman of the company. 5
Riccardo resigned and Lee Iacocca, who had come to Chrysler from
Ford in 1978, took over. The firm hired an investment banking firm and a
management consultant to help devise its restructuring plan. It also shifted
its public-relations strategy: the firm no longer argued that relief was
warranted by the burdens of the government's tax and regulatory policies;
instead, it blamed itself for past failures, but warned that a bankruptcy
would force 600,000 people out of work. It also shifted its lobbying efforts
from Congress's tax committees to the banking committees.
Chrysler and the Treasury negotiated throughout October 1979. Secre-
tary Miller continued to demand that the plan include larger financial
concessions from the banks and employees, and that the earnings projec-
tions on which the plan was based be better substantiated. The Treasury
commissioned several independent studies of Chrysler, the automobile in-
dustry, and the possible effects of a Chrysler bankruptcy. Meanwhile,
Chrysler's cash situation continued to deteriorate. Its losses for the third
quarter reached more than $450 million. No company in history had lost
so much money in so short a time. Chrysler was approaching default on
its loans. Its share of the U.S. automobile market was now down to less
than nine percent.
Chrysler's congressional allies were growing impatient. Senator Don
Riegle and Representative James Blanchard, both from Michigan and
both members of their respective chambers' banking committees, intro-
duced loan guarantee legislation. Both committees held hearings at which
Lee Iacocca, Douglas Fraser, and Coleman Young argued for loan guar-
34. Interview with G. William Miller, former Secretary of the Treasury, in Washington, D.C.
(Jan. 17, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Miller Interview].
35. Id.
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antees. John McGillicuddy of Manufacturers Hanover explained that
Chrysler executives have "substantially exhausted their remedies in the
private sector, from a lending point of view, and are now in a position
where they need Federal assistance if they are to implement their plan
and bring their organization back on its feet."36
On November 1, 1979, Secretary Miller announced the administration's
support for a $1.5 billion loan guarantee. He explained that the adminis-
tration's original estimate of $750 million was far short of what was
needed to put Chrysler back on a sound footing. 7 Immediately, Chrysler
swung into action, seeking congressional relief before the end of the year.
Chrysler dealers, members of the United Auto Workers (UAW), and key
suppliers all visited congressional offices, armed with printouts showing
Chrysler and Chrysler-related jobs in each district. There was no organ-
ized opposition, save for relatively weak lobbying by the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers, the National Taxpayers Union, and Ralph
Nader's Congress Watch.
Nevertheless, certain members of Congress did press for specific provi-
sions in the loan guarantee legislation. At the behest of Senator Russell
Long, the proposal was amended to include an employee stock ownership
plan." Senators Richard Lugar and Paul Tsongas held out for greater
concessions from the employees.39 Other members simply opposed the
whole idea on the basis that the "free market" should be allowed to work
its will.4 °
The final bill was enacted on December 20 in the House and on the
following day in the Senate.4 1 A few weeks later, in a subdued White
House ceremony, President Carter signed the Chrysler Loan Guarantee
Act while Douglas Fraser and Lee Iacocca watched. The law provided
guidelines for approximately $2 billion of financial concessions required of
the banks, employees, dealers, suppliers, and states, to be matched by $1.5
billion of federal loan guarantees.4 It also established a loan guarantee
36. Chrysler Corp. Loan Guarantee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 5805 Before the Subcomm.
on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 824 (1979) (statement of John McGillicuddy, Chairman, Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co.) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
37. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1979, at 1, col. 6.
38. 125 CONG. REC. 27,180-81 (1979).
39. 125 CONG. REC. 36,638-44 (1979).
40. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. 37,059 (1979) (statement of Sen. Goldwater) ("I think this [bailout
of Chrysler] is probably the biggest mistake that Congress has ever made in its history."); 125 CONG.
REC. 36,220-22 (1979) (extension of remarks of Rep. D. Crane) ("Clearly, such largesse [to the
Chrysler Corp.] would be the end of the free enterprise system.").
41. Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1979)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1875). The authority of the Loan Guarantee Board to issue new
guarantees for loans to Chrysler expired on December 31, 1983. 15 U.S.C. § 1875 (1982).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1863(c) (1982) (requiring $1,430,000,000 in concessions from creditors); §
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board comprised of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, and the Comptroller General to monitor the com-
pany's compliance with the legislation and to authorize issuance of guar-
antees upon finding that the company continued to be "viable." '43
Chrysler's losses for the year totaled $1.1 billion. Iacocca said, "The
hard part starts now""-getting the various groups to agree to come up
with $2 billion worth of concessions. Chrysler's workers were the first to
cooperate. Annual pay increases specified in the industry-wide "pattern"
contract (which Chrysler workers already had agreed to delay in their
October contract talks) would be postponed further, putting Chrysler
workers six months behind Ford and General Motors employees that year
and another five-and-one-half months behind the next year. The 250-
member Chrysler Council approved the new contract on January 9, 1980;
three weeks later it was approved by more than seventy-five percent of the
workers voting in seventy-five Chrysler locals. One UAW official ex-
plained the large margin of victory: "The debate in Congress over federal
aid and all the publicity convinced them. They voted to save their jobs."' 5
In addition, the UAW leaders agreed to allow Chrysler to postpone its
periodic payment to the union pension fund. Chrysler viewed this as a
"contribution" worth $413 million, even though the government, as in-
surer of pensions through the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation,46
ultimately would pick up the tab should Chrysler fall into bankruptcy.
Creditors were more recalcitrant. The Act required that creditors con-
tribute $650 million in loan concessions.' But by January Chrysler had
stopped paying both principal and interest on its outstanding debt. It was
now technically in default, and some lenders argued that their
forebearance from seeking bankruptcy was a form of contribution. Many
of the 400 lenders were convinced that Chrysler eventually was going to
fail. They feared that the government loan guarantee, which had priority
over their claims, would only drain away assets that might otherwise go to
the banks at liquidation. The banks also fought among themselves: Euro-
pean banks, and some small U.S. banks, demanded payment in full from
the larger U.S. lenders. Some banks seized funds Chrysler had deposited
with them and applied the funds against Chrysler's debts. The larger U.S.
1865(a)(1) (requiring $462,500,000 in concessions from Chrysler employees); § 1867 (limiting Board
authority to extend loan guarantees to $1,500,000,000).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982).
44. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1980, at Dl, col. 5.
45. Detroit Free Press, Feb. 2, 1980.
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1309 (1982).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1863(c)(1) (1982) (requiring at least $500,000,000 from U.S. banks, financial
institutions, and other creditors in the form of new loans or credits); § 1863(c)(2) (requiring at least
$150,000,000 from foreign banks, and other creditors).
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lenders insisted that every lender must sacrifice directly in proportion to
its outstanding loans. Negotiations dragged on through March and April,
with Chrysler and Manufacturers Hanover executives trying to strike a
deal with the others. Eventually the lenders agreed to defer certain debt
payments until after 1983, in exchange for $200 million in Chrysler pre-
ferred stock.
The new plan which Chrysler submitted to the Loan Board at the end
of April did not meet the legal requirements set out in the Loan Guaran-
tee Act. State and local governments had not yet committed funds; ,suppli-
ers and dealers only had agreed to "softer" terms on purchases; the lend-
ers' agreement to defer payments did not represent "new" money for
Chrysler. Nevertheless, the Loan Board conditionally approved the plan."8
Chrysler would receive $500 million in loan guarantees so long as the
various parties actually came up with the sacrifices to which they had
agreed.
Despite the Loan Board's leniency, the deal almost fell through. A few
small banks and several foreign banks still held out. By June, Chrysler
was without cash. It stopped paying its suppliers. Had they then stopped
supplying Chrysler, the company would have shut down. Secretary Miller
and his staff, now firmly committed to Chrysler's plan, applied pressure.
They met with the bank officials, explained that with anything less than
one-hundred-percent participation the entire deal would unravel, and sub-
tly threatened retaliation."9
Final agreement was reached on June 24. Chrysler received its $500
million loan guarantee. The Loan Board approved a second draw-down of
up to $300 million on July 15, 1980.50 The transaction, said Lee Iacocca,
represented "the most complex financial restructuring program in history
• . . for one purpose-to protect the jobs of 600,000 American workers
who build American cars for American buyers.""5
Throughout this period, Iacocca and other Chrysler executives reported
monthly to Secretary Miller, and daily to the Loan Board staff. "We were
like a board of directors," Miller said. "I tried to convince them that they
could no longer be a big car company, offering a full range of models.
48. The conditions are set forth in STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMIC STABILIZATION OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2ND SESS., FINDINGS OF
THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION LOAN GUARANTEE BOARD 39-45 (Comm. Print 1980).
49. Interview with Wendell Larsen, former Chrysler Vice-President for Public Affairs, in Chi-
cago, Ill. (Feb. 14, 1984). Legislation affecting bank regulation was pending in Congress; in addition,
one member of the Loan Board was Chairman Paul Volcker of the Federal Reserve Board, the gov-
ernment agency which directly regulated many of the banks.
50. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMIC STABILIZATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FI-
NANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2ND SESS., REPORT OF THE CHRYSLER CORPORATION LOAN
GUARANTEE BOARD 10-14 (Comm. Print 1980).
51. L. lacocca, Statement at Press Ceremony (June 25, 1980).
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They had to downsize the firm. They resisted the notion at first.""2 This
resistance, however, soon disappeared. Chrysler abandoned the full-size
car business, cut its production, and concentrated on compacts and sub-
compacts, including the much-vaunted K-car. Plants were closed, with
corresponding cuts in employment. When a UAW official charged in Oc-
tober 1980 that the Loan Board was putting "undue pressure on Chrysler
Corporation to strip down its operations," Secretary Miller insisted that
the Board's "sole objective" was to put Chrysler back on a "sound finan-
cial and operative plan."53
Despite the new money, Chrysler's plight did not improve. The K-car
did not sell, in part because the Federal Reserve Board was drastically
restricting the money supply, forcing interest rates to more than twenty
percent and thereby discouraging automobile sales. By the end of 1980,
Chrysler was back to the Loan Board for a third installment. This time
Secretary Miller and the Board demanded even greater sacrifices from the
constituent groups. The Board held all the cards: if the Board did not
approve additional loan guarantees soon, responsibility for resolving the
situation would shift to the Reagan Administration, which was not likely
to be sympathetic.
Miller summoned Chrysler executives, bankers, and union officials to
an eleventh-hour meeting at the Treasury Department in early January
1981. There he met separately with representatives of each group, squeez-
ing them for more concessions. In the end, the union agreed to cut wages
by $1.15 an hour and freeze them at that level until September 1982; the
banks agreed to convert $1 billion of Chrysler's $2 billion debt into pre-
ferred stock, and accept repayment on the other half at a rate of thirty
cents on the dollar. No one was happy with the deal. William Langley, an
executive from Manufacturers Hanover, claimed that the banks had been
forced to the wall and had borne the brunt of the sacrifice. 4 Douglas
Fraser called it "the worst economic settlement we ever made. The only
thing worse is the alternative-which is no jobs."55 The Board approved a
final installment of $400 million in loan guarantees.
Chrysler came back from the dead, earning a small profit in 1982.
Helped by the strong upturn in the U.S. car market in 1983, the company
earned more than $700 million, a swing of more than $1 billion from the
same period two years before. Chrysler had cut its long-term debt from
$2.15 billion in 1983 to $1.07 billion, paid $116.9 million in back divi-
52. Miller Interview, supra note 34.
53. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1980, at D5, col. 4.
54. Interview with William Langley, Executive Vice-President of Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., in New York City (Jan. 10, 1984).
55. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1981, § 3, at 15, col. 2.
Vol. 2: 163, 1985
Bailout
dends on preferred stock, strengthened its capital structure by exchanging
$1.1 billion in preferred stock and warrants for common shares, and re-
tired 14.4 million warrants held by the Treasury for $311 million. Its
share price rose to $35 during the summer of 1983-more than seven
times higher than its low in 1982.
The company was now "lean and mean," in the words of Lee
Iacocca." Its production capacity had been slashed to approximately
750,000 cars, down from a peak of almost 1.6 million in 1968. Its total
employment was down to approximately 70,000, from 160,000 just five
years before (U.S. employment shrank from 110,000 to 60,000). It pro-
duced far fewer models, had no foreign subsidiaries (except for a plant in
Mexico), had a far smaller budget for developing new models and techno-
logical innovations (though it was now producing several new models, in-
cluding a highly successful mini-van), and was relying heavily on Japa-
nese producers to fill out its product line and supply it with technology.
Nevertheless, the company had survived and had, according to Iacocca,
"won its long battle for independence." 7
II. Patterns
These four cases appear to have a great deal in common. Each manu-
facturing company was highly successful in the past. Each expanded rap-
idly during the boom years of the 1960's, becoming extremely large by the
start of the 1970's. Each had difficulty consolidating and "digesting" its
expansion. Each became deeply in debt. In each case, the combination of
past successes and the rapid build-up made the company unable or un-
willing to change direction, even in light of signs that the market for its
products was leveling off or declining. Each company therefore was highly
vulnerable to the oil shocks, deep recessions, and sharp changes in inter-
national competition which characterized the middle and late 1970's.
In addition, each of these companies was a major regional employer. By
the early 1970's, each accounted for five to ten percent of the manufactur-
ing jobs in areas like the State of Niedersachsen in West Germany, the
British Midlands around Coventry anfd Liverpool, the Hiroshima Prefec-
ture in Japan, and the Great Lakes region around Detroit and northern
Ohio. Each also purchased a significant percentage of materials and com-
ponents produced within the region or in regions nearby. Although esti-
mates of indirect employment vary, each of these companies clearly had a
pivotal position within at least one regional economy, producing the larg-
56. Interview with Lee Iacocca, President of Chrysler Corp., in New York City (Nov. 9, 1983).
57. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1984, at 3, col. 1.
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est item of trade between the region and the national and world econo-
mies, and thereby supporting countless smaller businesses producing both
goods and services.58
In each instance, the first clear sign of crisis was a shortage of cash
which compelled company executives to seek additional short-term credit
from the company's lead bank. Within months, the shortage of operating
capital grew significantly. Losses ballooned. Company executives denied
the extent of the crisis. They continued to view it as a temporary cash-
flow problem which would sort itself out as soon as the economy im-
proved, when the company developed a technical "fix" for its declining
competitiveness, or when its new product line was unveiled. In each case
the lead bank forced the company's hand by refusing to make additional
loans.
As the crises deepened, control of each company shifted out of the hands
of the incumbent executives to a third party which oversaw the transition
to a new management team. This third party also negotiated with the
various interests who had a continuing stake in the company, seeking fi-
nancial sacrifices from them in order to keep the company going. In re-
turn, the third party agreed to bear a considerable share of the cost itself,
including the investment of new money. Although government was in-
volved in every case, the third party was the lead bank for AEG-
Telefunken and Toyo Kogyo; for British Leyland and Chrysler the third
party was a government agency.
There is, however, a deeper set of comparisons to be drawn. In none of
these four cases was the company formally liquidated. Although AEG-
Telefunken resorted to a limited type of formal reorganization under court
protection, in none of the cases did a receiver or trustee oversee a full,
formal reorganization under the bankruptcy laws. Nevertheless, a reor-
ganization of sorts did take place. The companies were refinanced and
reorganized, assets were redeployed, new products were developed, and
various parties had to sacrifice in the short term for the sake of longer-
term rewards. Parts of the companies were "liquidated" in the sense that
certain assets were sold off and employees let go. In each case the bailout
was effected by a mix of shrinking the company and shifting some work-
ers and assets.
58. AEG: Weltfirma am Abgrund, DER SPIEGEL, Nov. 19, 1979, at 75 (discussing the role of
AEG in the West German economy); RYDER REPORT, supra note 16, app. B, at 74 (discussing re-
gional employment by BL); Interview with Ichiro Maeda, Assistant General Manager of Toyo Kogyo
for Corporate Planning, in Hiroshima, Japan (Sept. 16, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Maeda Interview]
(discussing effects on Japan); The Chrysler Corp. Financial Situation: Hearings before the House
Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 187-227 (1979) (report on the employment and economic effects of a shutdown
or major reduction of business by Chrysler).
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A. Shrinking the Company
Given the size and importance of these companies, the groups request-
ing government aid argued that the free market and the profit motive on
which market transactions are based could not be relied upon to ensure
the well-being of citizens dependent on the enterprise. And yet, paradoxi-
cally, each of the companies ended up substantially smaller than it was
originally.59 This paradox appeared repeatedly in public discussions and
debates over what to do about these companies: the company had to be
saved because so many people were dependent on it, but the only way to
save it was to reduce drastically its size and thereby harm the very people
who depended on it. Market processes, including bankruptcy, would re-
sult in a significant portion of the company being sold off or liquidated for
scrap, so it was necessary to subsidize the company while it sold off or
liquidated a significant portion of itself.
The bailout of AEG-Telefunken is a case in point. Count Lambsdorff
justified the West German government's decision to provide AEG-
Telefunken with loan guarantees by reference to how important the firm
was to the West German economy. 60 His secretary, Otto Schlecht pointed
to the hundreds of thousands of workers who depended on the company
and the 30,000 separate companies which provided it with materials and
supplies, and noted that a "[bailout] in this instance is less costly for Ger-
many than bankruptcy."61 But Lambsdorff had approved the loan guar-
antees only after an independent audit concluded that the company could
survive as long as it continued to cut drastically its size and payroll.
We see a similar apparent inconsistency in the case of Toyo Kogyo.
Tsutomi Murai, managing director of the Sumitomo Bank, who took over
as vice president of Toyo Kogyo, made the rounds of business leaders in
Hiroshima to assure them that the bank's intention in taking over the
troubled company was to save jobs. The bank also requested assistance
from the prefecture on the same grounds. The new Toyo Kogyo managers
then proceeded to cut employment. "Obviously, we had to reduce costs,"
one bank official later explained, "and labor costs are among the most
important to reduce." 6
The same tension was present in the British Leyland case. The initial
59. AEG-Telefunken shrank from 105,000 West German employees at the start of the crisis to
60,000 by the time it was over (a 43% drop in employment); British Leyland, from 211,00 to slightly
more than 100,000 (52%); Toyo Kogyo, from 37,000 to 27,000 (27%); and Chrysler, from 110,000
U.S. employees to around 60,000 (45%).
60. Fin. Times, July 15, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
61. Schlecht, Darf der Staat sanierungsreifen Unternehmen helfen? [Should the Federal Govern-
ment Support Enterprises That Have Economic Problems?], WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST, Sept. 1982, at
423, 425.
62. Yamada Interview, supra note 28.
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debate in Parliament"8 clearly pitted Conservative against Labour, free-
market ideology against the socialization of costs. The conservatives ar-
gued that the free market should be allowed to function, that letting BL
go bankrupt would facilitate the redeployment of labor and capital to
more efficient uses. Labour countered by focusing on the hardships such a
bankruptcy would impose on the many people dependent on the
automaker. 6 ' Not surprisingly, the initial Labour plan for British Leyland
relied on a combination of new investment and more participation by the
workers in company management to restore the company to profitability."3
There was no mention of reducing the size of the company and cutting its
work force. Indeed, Lord Stokes, British Leyland's chairman, publicly
criticized this lack as the "worst aspect" of the plan." '66 Just two years
and more than $500 million later, the Labour government's National En-
63. 892 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1419-1538 (1975).
64. Mr. Enoch Powell summed up the Conservative view:
[W]hat bankruptcy brings about, and it does so harshly, is to make it possible for the resources
which have been devoted to making a loss to be reapplied in ways which are more likely to
make a profit.
We use the terms "loss" and "profit", but they disguise a much cruder reality-and that
cruder reality is destruction and creation. When men are employed in an undertaking which,
year after year, is making a loss, those men-who are the last people to-blame-are actually
destroying that which their fellow workers are creating. Less is going out than comes in; they
are involuntary parasites upon the economy. The benefit which bankruptcy confers, the benefit
which makes it indispensable, is that it enables resources which would otherwise be locked in
the work of destruction to be released for different applications, different combinations, differ-
ent circumstances, in which they can again be creative.
Immediately, however, public money comes upon the scene, immediately public money is to
be injected into an undertaking, all the criteria which would otherwise be brought to bear fly
out of the window and are replaced by a very different outlook. The private, cautious, calcu-
lated, experienced, almost cynical estimation of the likely prospects for the future is replaced
by the public commitments, by the political pressures and by the freedom from responsibility
which comes out of spending public money, money which is there to hand ...
[Bjankruptcy is indispensable and . . . there is no substitute for the judgment of bankruptcy
and for the liberating power of bankruptcy.
Id. at 1481-84.
Tony Benn, Secretary of State of Industry in the Labour government, responded to Powell and
several other Tories:
I am listening intently to the hon. Gentleman, who speaks with great clarity and seriousness
on these matters, but the more I listen to him the more I am utterly convinced that his argu-
ment leaves out of account that there is not only the balance sheets but the ballot box. He
speaks of people as if they can be moved at the behest of the owners of industry without regard
to the political and social factors which are the basis of our standing in the House . . . [T]he
people represented through the ballot box intend to exercise, and do exercise, a countervailing
power to the use he would wish to make of them as pawns in a financial game.
Id. at 1493.
Soon after the Parliamentary debate, Keith Joseph, a member of the Conservative Shadow Cabinet
who was to be Secretary of State for Industry in the Thatcher government, condemned Benn's posi-
tion: "In order to preserve jobs in over-manned, inefficient British Leyland, Mr. Benn will take astro-
nomic money from the rest of the country and thus cause many other firms to fail .... Mr. Benn is
the real manufacturer of poverty." Fin. Times, May 3, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
65. Our Very Own British Leyland, ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 1975, at 88.
66. Fin. Times, May 8, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
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terprise Board hired a new chief executive for the company who, with the
full approval of the government, set about slashing its work force.67 By
then it was clear that such cuts were the only way to save the company.
When the Conservatives regained power in 1979, the reduction in em-
ployment at BL was well underway. Job cuts accelerated over the next
two years. At the start of 1981, however, Margaret Thatcher's govern-
ment decided to give British Leyland more than $2.4 billion, a far larger
infusion of new equity than had ever been contemplated by the Labour
Party, because Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had
determined that liquidation of the firm would increase unemployment in
Britain by 150,000 people (including the employees of suppliers), and
thereby boost public welfare spending by approximately $7 billion a
year.68 Keith Joseph, the Industrial Secretary who approved the payment,
told the press: "We tried to find a middle way but there was no middle
way. Whether we accepted or rejected [British Leyland's request for more
aid] the taxpayers would have been clobbered."69
The debate in the United States over Chrysler followed a similar path.
In the congressional hearings on the loan guarantee, Detroit's Mayor
Coleman Young cited estimates that a Chrysler bankruptcy would double
the number of unemployed in Detroit to about twenty percent of the city's
population. Other cities would be hit hard as well: the Wilmington-
Newark, Delaware area would lose 14,000 jobs; St. Louis would lose
more than 25,000; Syracuse, N.Y., and Huntsville, Alabama would have
their unemployment rates doubled; Newcastle, Indiana, would lose one-
third of its jobs; Kokomo, Indiana, faced a forty percent cut in its jobs.7
The individual suffering caused by such losses would be considerable:
[A]lthough economic theoreticians may be comforted by the fact that
over the long term our economy would adjust, this is no comfort to
those in so many of our cities who face the loss of a job. Because of
age, some of those, as a matter of reality, will never be able to find a
job again, or at least will never be able to find a job at anything close
to comparable wage rates or in the places where they now live.
72
Congressman Jim Wright, the House Majority Leader, urged his col-
67. Ball, Saving Leyland is a Job for Hercules, FORTUNE, July 3, 1978, at 58, 61.
68. BL: It's the Thought that Counts, supra note 22, at 48; Brighter Future for British Cars?,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1981, at 77.
69. Brighter Future for British Cars?, supra note 68, at 77.
70. Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1965 and S. 1937 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033 (1979) (state-
ment of Coleman Young, Mayor of Detroit) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
71. Id. at 1032.
72. House Hearings, supra note 36, at 343 (statement of Coleman Young, Mayor of Detroit).
Yale Journal on Regulation
leagues to support the aid bill, arguing that a Chrysler bankruptcy would
cost the federal government $14 billion to $15 billion and plunge the na-
tion into a full-scale recession.7 The $15 billion figure included $11 bil-
lion in lower taxes and higher welfare and unemployment payments, a
$1.1 billion drain on the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, and a
$3 billion rise in the trade deficit as foreign cars picked up much of
Chrysler's market share. Wright warned that the failure of Chrysler
would trigger an economic calamity. A loan guarantee would be in keep-
ing with the tradition that says if "your neighbor's barn caught fire and
burned down, then all of the rest of those who lived in the community
would provide a little bit of their substance to help and that that was part
and parcel of the American spirit." '
These sentiments were opposed by those who urged that the market be
allowed to work its will. Walter Wriston, the chairman of Citicorp, testi-
fied against the loan guarantees:
There is no avoiding the fact that it is an attempt by the Govern-
ment to move economic resources to places where they would not
otherwise go. Such distortions inevitably lead to less, not more, pro-
ductivity-and therefore to fewer jobs, less return on investment, and
fewer bona fide lending opportunities for banks and everyone else. 7 5
Peter G. Peterson, chairman of the investment banking firm of Lehman
Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., and a former Secretary of Commerce under the
Nixon Administration, warned that a loan guarantee would make
Chrysler a permanent ward of the state: "There is clearly a grave danger
here that the ultimate costs of government assistance may escalate far be-
yond the initial projections and that even then, the problem will not have
been resolved." '7 6 Peterson implied that he would let Chrysler fail rather
than set a precedent for other federal bailouts.7 His sentiments were
echoed by the Business Roundtable, a group of chief executives of very
large companies, which issued a statement in opposition to the loan guar-
-antees: "Whatever the hardships of failure may be for the particular com-
panies and individuals, the broad social and economic interest of the na-
tion are best served by allowing this system to operate as freely and as
fully as possible." 8
The proponents of the loan guarantee, many hoping to save jobs, won
73. Id. at 684 (statement of Rep. Wright).
74. Id.
75. Senate Hearings, supra note 70, at 1286 (statement of Walter Wriston, Chairman, Citicorp).
76. Id. at 777 (statement of Peter G. Peterson, Chairman, Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc.).
77. Id. at 778.
78. 37 CONG. Q. 2752 (Dec. 1, 1979).
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the legislative battle. Once administration of the loan guarantee program
was firmly in place within the Treasury Department, however, a different
viewpoint seemed to predominate. Treasury officials were bent on restor-
ing Chrysler to competitive health as soon as possible, thereby protecting
the government's investment. "My job was to make sure that the govern-
ment was protected," said Brian Freeman, who served as executive direc-
tor of the Loan Guarantee Board. "That meant making sure that
Chrysler was viable."' 79 The objective of restoring Chrysler to quick
health required, that the firm cut costs and lay off workers. Treasury offi-
cials pushed Chrysler to drastically reduce its size. G. William Miller,
who was Secretary of the Treasury at the time, talked about the difficul-
ties involved:
The truth is Lee [Iacocca] didn't want a downsized company when
we started this; we had to fight for it. We weren't on the same wave-
length. The first proposal he gave me I just slid . . . back across the
table and said, "you haven't thrown any ballast off yet. When the
ship starts to sink, the first thing you do is get rid of ballast."" °
In the end, the Treasury view prevailed, and Chrysler shrank to almost
half its size.
One way to explain the apparent shift in objective, from saving jobs at
the expense of efficiency to saving the company at the expense of jobs, is
to view the reorganization process as moving from a political to an admin-
istrative frame of reference. At the political stage, the company's plight is
described as a public problem requiring a public response. Bankruptcy
would result in huge social costs, falling disproportionately on certain
groups of people. Such a result would be unfair, and in any event would
require vast public assistance. Therefore, it is far more equitable, and less
costly to the public, for the company to be given special aid.
With the political battle won, the problem then becomes one of ad-
ministering aid to the troubled company. Financial specialists now take
charge. Their professional training is in helping companies to improve
their cash flow and balance sheets, not in keeping people employed. They
are judged by how quickly they restore companies to financial health, not
by how well they maintain the income streams of employees and sub-
contractors. They work within ministries of finance, treasury departments,
and commercial loan departments of large banks-institutions whose
traditional roles involve ensuring fiscal responsibility and prudence, rather
79. Interview with Brian Freeman, former Executive Director of the Chrysler Loan Guarantee
Board, in Cambridge, Mass. (Feb. 2, 1984).
80. Miller Interview, supra note 34.
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than promoting social welfare or distributional justice. These administra-
tors naturally come to see their task as making a financial "deal" similar
to other deals with which they have been associated. Former Secretary of
Treasury G. William Miller described the Chrysler loan guarantee from
the vantage point of the Treasury Department:
It was just a professional reorganization outside of bankruptcy. One
of the problems of doing it as public policy is that you can't count on
every administration to have people in place who can do that sort of
thing. We happened to have a set of industrialists and lawyers who
were not strange to deals like this."'
Because the political mandate to save jobs inevitably is short-lived, and
because political agendas are crowded and public attention can be focused
on such a problem for only a short time before other issues predominate,
administrators have considerable leeway in shifting to the objective of sav-
ing the company and minimizing the financial exposure of their own insti-
tution, even at the expense of jobs. Moreover, a goal like "saving jobs" is
difficult to define and measure with certainty; by the time the crisis is
apparent, many jobs already will have been lost, and additional job losses
are to be expected. The administrators, however, face at least two con-
straints on their discretion.
The first is the limited ability of democratic politics to withstand the
pressures generated by extremely rapid change: political and administra-
tive goals are precariously balanced. If administrators move too quickly to
restore the company through cuts in employment, the issue may move
back into the political realm. We see elements of this constraint in all four
cases. In the AEG-Telefunken rescue, Dresdner Bank officials justified an
industry-led bailout to other banks and insurance companies on the
ground that continued rapid job losses otherwise would force a political
solution. When this "private" bailout itself began to result in rapid job
losses, labor leaders pushed for nationalization of the company. 2 In the
British Leyland case, after the National Enterprise Board finally acceded
to substantial job cuts, the Labour Party grew deeply divided over the
proper course of the rescue, with back-benchers calling for a change in
management.88 As Sumitomo Bank executives began to shrink Toyo
Kogyo, leaders of Hiroshima expressed growing concern, with the implicit
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Labor is Bracing for AEG's Collapse, BUS. WK., Sept. 6, 1982, at 42, 43; Fin.
Times, Aug. 12, 1982, at 16, col. 2.
83. Can British Leyland Survive?, NEW STATESMAN, Jan. 27, 1978, at 108-09.
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threat of political recourse if the situation grew markedly worse.84 When
the Loan Guarantee Board began to press Chrysler to reduce its size,
labor leaders pressed Congress and the Carter Administration to inter-
cede.85 Under this view, the threat of political intervention caused these
administrators to temper their enthusiasm and slow down their efforts to
save the company by cutting labor costs.
This shift from a political to an administrative frame of reference, how-
ever, cannot explain the administrators' apparent willingness to pour ad-
ditional funds into the company, and their corresponding reluctance to
allow the company to fall into bankruptcy, even when it showed no signs
of revival. This tenacity is particularly interesting in the two cases in
which governments ostensibly committed to the free market significantly
increased public assistance, at a time when both companies seemed des-
tined for eventual bankruptcy: AEG-Telefunken under a fragile coalition
between the Social Democrats and the conservative Free Democrats and
British Leyland under the Conservatives. When asked to explain their
sharp departures from party ideology and rhetoric, both West Germany's
Count Lambsdorff and Britain's Keith Joseph pointed out that providing
government assistance to the company was far cheaper than providing it
to all the people who would be unemployed in the event of a bank-
ruptcy.8" Each government had every incentive to do its calculation care-
fully, taking full account of any segments of the company that probably
would find another use in short order. Nevertheless, each determined that
company assistance would be cheaper than social assistance.
At first blush this conclusion seems especially curious, coming as it does
from conservative leaders, none of whom was particularly dependent on
labor support. To be sure, the rather generous programs of unemploy-
ment assistance for which unemployed workers are eligible in these coun-
tries are themselves the results of earlier political compromises. But even
with these social programs firmly in place, it seems strange that these
governments would have preferred subsidies for the ailing companies.
Though costly, unemployment insurance at least would permit workers to
find alternative employment eventually. Bankruptcy at least would allow
assets of the ailing company to be released into the economy, eventually to
be put to better use. The bailout alternative might be a permanent drain
on public resources, and a permanent misallocation of resources in the
economy. One would expect free marketeers to argue that though in the
84. Yamada Interview, supra note 28.
85. Interview with Douglas Fraser, former President of the United Auto Workers, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Oct. 19, 1983).
86. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 61 and 69.
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short term it may be more expensive to allow the company to go under, in
the long term this route is far cheaper than any other.
The surest explanation for the support of free market advocates for cor-
porate bailouts is that company assistance was not seen as a permanent
subsidy. It was, rather, a means of slowing down the inevitable shrinkage
of the enterprise. Bankruptcy would work too quickly; the resulting mar-
ket disruption would be too great. If the company suddenly dissolved its
least competitive parts, large numbers of workers in particular regions of
the country would simultaneously lose their jobs. This sudden burst of
unemployment would have devastating effects on the economy, with mul-
tiplier effects as suppliers and services lost customers and could not collect
on accounts. By extending the decline over a longer period of time, how-
ever, policymakers could ease the adjustment. Fewer people would be out
of work at any given time, and growing businesses might be able to absorb
many of them. Suppliers might lose the failing company as a customer,
but would have time to develop alternative customers. Fewer workers and
small businesses would face a credit crunch, and this would reduce the
pressure on other small businesses, services, and lending institutions. See-
ing the coming decline, creditors and shareholders also could make grad-
ual adjustments, writing down their loans and altering their portfolios
with minimal disruption. In short, given the size and importance of these
companies to their economies, bankruptcy would release vast resources far
more quickly than the market could absorb them. What was needed,
therefore, was slow bankruptcy. This need is the source of the second
constraint on administrative discretion: the reduction in the size of the
company must be sufficiently gradual so as not to cause severe economic
problems.
As we have seen, the shift from a political to an administrative frame of
reference-with the ever-present possibility that the issue would regain
public attention-also meant a slow shrinkage of the company. Under this
view, the administrators' willingness to provide additional assistance to the
company and thereby slow down the decline was a response to political
reality. If the shrinkage were too rapid and the resulting unemployment
too great within a particular time period, there would be political de-
mands to preserve the status quo. These demands in turn would make it
difficult, if not impossible, to restore the company to financial health. The
administrators' goal, therefore, was to shrink the company as fast as polit-
ics would permit in order to regain solvency and protect their institutional
investment. Under the slow bankruptcy view, on the other hand, a very
different constraint governed administrators' decisionmaking. This second
constraint was imposed by the economy's limited ability to adjust to ex-
tremely rapid change. Operating under this limitation, the administrators'
Vol. 2: 163, 1985
Bailout
goal was to shrink the company only as fast as the economy would permit
in order to ease the process of economy-wide adjustment.
The British Leyland bailout seems to have moved from concern with
the first constraint to concern with the second over its seven-year course.
Between 1975 and 1977, when the issue of saving British Leyland jobs
was highly politicized, there were almost no layoffs. Between 1977 and
1979, still under the Labour government, the National Enterprise Board
and BL's new executives cut employment by about 30,000, a pace that
was as fast as these administrators could manage without politicizing the
issue once again. Between 1979 and 1981 the Conservatives, unconcerned
about union support, cut employment by almost 50,000. However, in
1981, faced with the possibility of an even more rapid dissolution, the
Tories held back. The social costs of unemployment were rising, not just
for former BL employees and subcontractors, but for the nation as a
whole, and it seemed that a quicker decline would imperil the entire econ-
omy. The Thatcher government decided to give BL a major infusion of
new capital. Job cuts thereafter slowed down to the earlier pace of around
15,000 per year.
The Chrysler pattern is slightly different. In this case, the greatest
number of layoffs-30,000 of them-came in 1979, the very year that
Chrysler was ostensibly seeking government assistance to save jobs. The
magnitude of the layoffs served to put Chrysler on the political agenda. In
1980 and 1981, after the issue had moved from Congress to the Treasury
Department, the pace of layoffs slowed. About 17,000 workers were laid
off during those two years. As we have seen, once the loan guarantee
legislation was passed, the Treasury Secretary and the staff of the Loan
Board urged Chrysler to slim down. It is interesting to note, however, that
by then Chrysler had already done most of its slimming. Had Chrysler
maintained the same pace of layoffs in 1980 and 1981 that it had in 1979,
the company would have ended 1981 with a mere 10,000 employ-
ees-fewer than were expected to be employed after a formal bankruptcy.
Presumably the company would have cut back its suppliers to a similar
degree. However, given the problem of high, and rising, unemployment,
particularly in the Midwest and the industrial belt of the Northeast, the
social costs of such a sudden demise would have been prohibitive.
B. Shifting Workers and Assets
So far we have assumed that the only reason for subsidizing these com-
panies was, paradoxically, to shrink them, but to do so more slowly than
would have been possible had they been left to the market and bank-
ruptcy. The evidence suggests this pattern, although it is unclear whether
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it was attributable to financial administrators who were engaged in a kind
of tug-of-war with politicians, or to economic ministers who were keeping
a watchful eye on how quickly the economy could adjust to the company's
gradual demise, or to some combination of both. To round out our discus-
sion, however, we need to recognize another pattern in these cases. It con-
cerns the shift which occurred within each company during its crisis to-
ward more competitive products and processes, and better use of
employees.
If the market for the company's products had irrevocably declined, or if
the company had simply grown too large and ungainly to serve its market
profitably, then we could understand the crisis simply as a failure of the
company to shrink in a timely manner. Resources were kept too long, as if
the company had erected a dam to block the natural outward flow of such
resources in pursuit of more profitable uses. By the time the crisis ap-
peared, the company was huge, and the dam extraordinarily high. If the
dam broke, the pent-up resources would have inundated the economy, or
else politics would have interceded to shore up the dam at all costs. The
challenge was to reduce the reservoir of misallocated resources gradually,
so that they could be absorbed elsewhere without igniting more political
demands.
But this metaphor is too tidy. Markets change; new markets develop.
Each company might have shifted its research, plant, equipment, cash,
and employee resources in the direction in which the markets seemed to
be moving or in the direction of new, emerging markets. In other words,
to avert crisis the company whose old market was declining need not have
watched passively as its productive resources flowed out to more profitable
uses. It could have put its resources to better uses internally by shifting
them to new products and more efficient processes. Even after the crisis
occurred, the company still had the option of shifting instead of shrinking.
The reservoir of misallocated resources lying behind the dam could have
been rechanneled in other directions rather than simply allowed to flow
out.
In each of our cases, some such shift occurred after the crisis broke.
AEG-Telefunken invested anew in telecommunications and defense re-
lated technologies. British Leyland developed new automobile models, and
improved the quality of its Land Rover and Jaguar. Toyo Kogyo invested
in new models and the development of a fuel-efficient rotary engine.
Chrysler developed several new compacts and a new mini-van. All these
shifts appear to have been successful. All adapted to new markets. All
entailed a redeployment within the company of certain resources, includ-
ing people, that otherwise might have flowed out. All the shifts were en-
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couraged by the financial administrators who presided over the
reorganization.
Shifting resources, however, requires money. New products must be
designed and tested, plant and equipment converted, employees retrained,
the production system reorganized, dealers prepared, and consumers re-
oriented. The well-managed company, highly sensitive to potential
changes and new opportunities in the market, is constantly investing in
such shifts. On the other hand, the company that has disregarded such
changes and new opportunities, or is caught unaware by a sudden shock
to the market (such as that brought about by the introduction of a path-
breaking technology or a substantial increase in the price of a raw mate-
rial), may need to make a dramatic shift all at once, but lack the large
sums necessary to do so. This was the problem faced by all four of the
described companies. Once the crisis became apparent each of them
shifted, but the shifts were only partial. The companies could not redeploy
all of their resources internally because they did not have enough money
to make a complete transition. In addition, because their market shares
were declining and almost all their divisions were losing money, there was
no likelihood of finding another company to purchase all or a substantial
part of the ailing company.87
To some extent, shrinking and shifting are complementary strategies for
companies in distress. By liquidating the most costly and least profitable
operations, cash flow is enhanced. The new cash can then be invested in
shifting the remaining resources to more profitable uses. This shrink-and-
shift strategy was used by all four companies to some degree. All cut their
payrolls and, as we have seen, some of the revenues resulting from these
changes were invested in new products and improved manufacturing
processes.
The irony, of course, is that shrinking and shifting ultimately are in-
consistent. Human and capital assets that flow out of the company no
longer are available to be shifted. Even if the shrink-and-shift strategy is
enormously successful-so much so that the shrunken company finds itself
growing rapidly once again-the company may have difficulty summoning
back old suppliers, employees, dealers, customers, and certain specialized
assets. Time has elapsed. The discarded employees and suppliers are
87. Occasionally, parts of large failing firms may be sold off to other companies or groups of
investors, who expect that-due to their superior managerial acumen or "synergistic" aspects of their
other businesses-the newly spun-off divisions will offer a better return to them than they did as part
of the failing firm. This occurred to a limited extent in Chrysler, which sold off its tank division; it
occurred to a substantial extent in AEG-Telefunken, which sold off its consumer-products divisions.
In these transactions, title to plant, equipment, and employees are transfered to the new owners. From
a social standpoint, there has been no change, particularly no net loss of jobs. Wholesale transfers like
these, therefore, may represent a socially preferable alternative to shrinkage.
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likely to have linked up with other companies in the interim. Having once
been jettisoned by the old company, they may be unwilling to resume
what seems to be a precarious relationship. Under these circumstances it
may be more costly for the company to bid them back and shift them to
new uses than simply to find new suppliers, employees, dealers, custom-
ers, and specialized assets.
If markets adjusted to such changes with ease, and transactions such as
these were relatively costless, then it would not matter what combination
of shrinking and shifting were chosen. The company could be as profita-
ble after a great deal of shrinking and a small bit of shifting as the other
way around. The economy as a whole could adapt as easily to a dramatic
shrinkage in one of its largest companies as to a major shift.
The selection of a balance between shifting and shrinking does matter,
however. Markets do not always adjust with ease. Market transactions are
costly because parties often have difficulty getting adequate information.
Individual suppliers, employees, and other participants may find it diffi-
cult to attempt a shift for themselves-locating new uses for their services,
determining precisely what retraining they need, and ferreting out reliable
buyers and sellers. On the other hand, networks of suppliers, managers,
employees, dealers, and customers who have dealt with one another over a
long period of time may have a sufficiently subtle understanding of one
another's needs and performance that transactions among them are highly
efficient. Under these circumstances, it is likely to be less costly for the
company to shift them as a group than for individual actors to engage in a
large number of "retail" transactions among strangers.
Besides potential efficiency advantages of internal redeployment, there
may be social advantages as well. Companies like these exist at the center
of intricate social networks. They anchor communities and define relation-
ships and obligations over time. They shape community values as they
order social life. Their sudden demise may rend the community
irreparably.
This is not to suggest that shifting is always preferable to shrinking,
either for the company or for society as a whole. Even if workers, finan-
cial intermediaries, and other constituents were perfectly willing to invest
in a wholesale shift, there simply may be no profitable alternative for the
specialized networks of people that would justify the investment. The
point is that shifting is sometimes preferable.
Such shifts nevertheless are unlikely to take place if each of the com-
pany's constituencies remains unwilling to sacrifice, either waiting for
other constituents to make the first move, or appropriating assistance for
its own outside uses. Under this logic, the outside assistance provided in
the cases described above should have been used for shifting, rather than
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for compensating employees, suppliers, creditors, or other parties for sac-
rifices they were making in light of the cash crisis then affecting the com-
panies. Otherwise, the assistance would simply amount to a transfer of
wealth from one group (taxpayers or shareholders of the lead bank) to
those being compensated. No real shift would occur.
The tension between wealth transfer and investment exists to a degree
in all of our cases. For example, Alfred Kahn, then chairman of the
Council on Wage and Price Stability, caused a stir when he pointed out
that the initial deal struck between the United Auto Workers and
Chrysler, while saving the firm between $203 million and $206 million in
wages and benefits relative to the old contract, nevertheless would cost the
company $1.3 billion over current wages during the three years of the
contract."8 This amount was just shy of the $1.5 billion loan guarantee
that the company was seeking. Without more sacrifice from the union,
therefore, it appeared that the government assistance would merely go into
the pockets of Chrysler workers, leaving the company unchanged. As we
might expect, more sacrifices were demanded as a condition of the loan
guarantee. British Leyland, by contrast, did not have to cope with an
Alfred Kahn. The bulk of government assistance to the troubled company
in that case went to the workers for salary increases and severance pay-
ments, rather than toward new products and processes.
To the extent that the tacit goal of the assistance was simply to slow the
pace of shrinkage, it did not matter that funds were diverted from invest-
ment into such payoffs. After all, the payoffs accomplished approximately
the same underlying objective-they helped ease the pain of adjusting to a
much smaller company by compensating those who otherwise would be
hurt. But to the extent that new investment and internal redeployment
was considered socially preferable to an "orderly" shrinkage and external
redeployment, then the diversion was perverse. It prevented internal
shifts.
Of all our cases, Toyo Kogyo shifted the most and shrunk the least. Its
employment declined by only twenty-seven percent during the crisis. At
the same time it completely transformed its manufacturing process and
produced a wide array of new models. Most of the assistance provided to
the company by the Sumitomo Group and, indirectly, by the regional and
national governments, was invested in the shift. There were no payoffs,
aside from continued interest payments to the banks on the company's
accumulated debt. Suppliers and dealers continued to absorb losses; man-
agers and employees took major cuts in wages and benefits; five thousand
88. Senate Hearings, supra note 70, at 701 (statement of Alfred Kahn, Chairman, Council on
Wage and Price Stability).
Yale Journal on Regulation
production employees were temporarily transferred to dealers. Even when
Toyo Kogyo sold its stock and real estate holdings to raise additional cash,
it maintained the ability to summon these resources back to the fold, the
purchasers being other members of the Sumitomo Group which, in effect,
merely held these assets until Toyo Kogyo was able to reclaim them. 8'
Thus, Toyo Kogyo managed better than the other companies in our sam-
ple to preserve its network of people and assets during the crisis, and
simultaneously to shift them to new production.
At the other end of the spectrum lies British Leyland, which shrunk
more than it shifted. It cut the size of its workforce by fifty-two percent
during its crisis, but did not fundamentally alter its products, manufactur-
ing processes, or organization. As we have seen, most of the assistance was
diverted into payoffs. Neither the employees, suppliers, dealers, nor banks
bore any special sacrifice. Most of the bailout amounted to a simple trans-
fer by which British taxpayers compensated those who otherwise might
have been burdened by the company's contraction.
III. Explanations
The discussion above has identified two related phenomena in the four
crisis-ridden companies-shrinking and shifting. Once the company re-
ceived extraordinary assistance, the pace of its shrinkage was linked both
to the likelihood of continued political interference in financial administra-
tors' efforts to return the company to solvency, and to the economy's over-
all ability to absorb idled resources. The extent to which the company
shifted its resources to more profitable pursuits rather than simply let
them flow out, however, seems to have been related to how tightly the
extraordinary assistance was tied to company investments instead of
payoffs to its constituents.
Interestingly, the two relationships appear to have moved in the oppo-
site direction: the slower the pace of shrinkage, the smaller the proportion
of resources ultimately shifted. British Leyland's overall pace of shrinkage
while it received assistance was the slowest of our four examples, and it
also shifted the least. Toyo Kogyo's pace of shrinkage during its crisis was
faster than that of British Leyland,. but it shifted the most. AEG-
Telefunken and Chrysler were in the middle on both scales.
Explanations are not difficult to find. The Japanese economy was per-
forming relatively well during this period. Its unemployment averaged
under 2.5% of the labor force, and overall productivity was improving
89. Yamada Interview, supra note 28.
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3.8% a year.9" So we might expect that such adjustments-substantial in-
ternal shifts of resources coupled with the rapid release of whatever mar-
ginal resources could not be used even if the shift were highly success-
ful-would characterize many large companies. On the other hand,
during British Leyland's crisis, the British economy was performing
poorly, with unemployment averaging six percent of the labor force and
creeping upward. Yearly productivity improvements averaged only about
0.1%.9 Under these circumstances rapid shrinkage was politically prob-
lematic, and shifts were far more difficult to negotiate because every major
transaction was a zero-sum game.
It seems equally plausible, however, that cause and effect ran in the
opposite direction. Perhaps one explanation for Japan's relatively low un-
employment and high rates of productivity improvement during these tu-
multuous years of oil shocks, world recessions, and rapid technological
changes was the capacity of its large manufacturing enterprises to respond
very rapidly-in our parlance, to shrink quickly and shift substantially.
And perhaps one explanation for Britain's relatively poor performance lay
in the comparative inability of its large manufacturers to do the same.
The United States and West Germany, whose economic performance dur-
ing these years fell between the two poles, also occupied intermediate
points in the relative responsiveness of their larger manufacturers to rapid
economic change.
Viewed in this light, the important distinction among our examples
concerns not so much the intensity of political demands to save jobs-the
pressures were intense and the governments highly responsive in all four
cases. Rather, the important distinction is how the companies, and the set
of institutions of which they were a part, responded to these demands.
Toyo Kogyo's response was to jettison quickly a relatively small number
of jobs and to shift the rest. British Leyland's response was to jettison
slowly many of its jobs. AEG and Chrysler each attempted some of both.
How can we account for these differences in the patterns of response?
A rescue was organized in all four cases, but the rescues were substan-
tially different. Key institutions-labor, finance, and govern-
ment-assumed different sets of responsibilities and undertook them in
different ways. These variations resulted from the formal laws and infor-
mal understandings which governed the relationships among key institu-
tions. The following sections explore some of these differences and the
effects they had on the nature of the bailout in each instance.
90. For an analysis of all four countries' economic performances over the past five years, see U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, 10 INT'L ECON. INDICATORS (1984).
91. Id.
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A. Information and Control
One important difference is found in the timeliness and accuracy of
information received about the company's difficulties by those with suffi-
cient resources or influence to effectuate a rescue. Presumably, the earlier,
more reliable, and more detailed that information, the easier it was to set
a new course by shifting resources. Information coming much later, or of
poorer quality, impaired the ability of the rescuers to do very much other
than preside over a gradual shrinkage.
In the Toyo Kogyo case, the Sumitomo Bank knew of the firm's
problems almost at once. Toyo Kogyo had done well in 1973, but the
rapid rise in oil prices during the year made 1974 a disaster, causing the
company to post a loss of $75 million. By October 1974, the bank had
sent two of its senior officials over to Toyo Kogyo to take on financial
management of the firm temporarily. These officials thereafter supplied
the bank with highly detailed information about all aspects of the firm's
problems, and paved the way for a larger rescue team which took over
day-to-day management entirely.9
It was somewhat more difficult for the Dresdner Bank to get timely and
accurate information about AEG's problems. Although the bank's chief
executive also served as director of AEG's supervisory board, the board
was slow to obtain detailed information, largely because of the tensions
between labor and management representatives on the board.9" Losses
mounted steadily for six years before they reached the crisis level of $580
million in 1979, finally forcing Dresdner Bank's hand.
Chrysler's problems were even better hidden. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co. received the same quarterly reports that investment analysts
and shareholders received, but these merely summarized Chrysler's gradu-
ally worsening position, without explanation. Sometimes the figures
masked reality. In 1978, for example, when slumping car sales began to
push the company into the red and forced it to halt production at many
plants and slash dividends by sixty percent, the company still managed to
project a fourth-quarter profit. Thanks to a little-noticed actuarial adjust-
ment, Chrysler merely changed the assumed rate of return on its employee
pension portfolio to seven percent from six percent, reducing pension costs
and adding about $50 million to its profits.94 Manufacturers Hanover did
not receive even moderately accurate projections of the firm's earnings or
explanations of its problems until the Treasury Department's auditors
92. Yamada Interview, supra note 28.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 106 and 107.
94. Wall St. J., June 20, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
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and research began to obtain better information as a condition for the loan
guarantee. 95 By then, the crisis was well underway.
British Leyland is the extreme case. Although news that British Ley-
land had problems came relatively early, there was very little information
about the problems themselves, or the prospects for solving them. When
the firm went to the government at the end of 1974, its losses for the year
were only $46 million-small by comparison with AEG-Telefunken or
Chrysler. BL's banks, which had just refused to provide the company with
any more loans, knew only that the firm's cash position was deteriorating
rapidly. The government thereupon appointed a special commission to in-
vestigate, but the resulting Ryder Report contained no detailed assess-
ments or projections. Its authors had done little more than ask BL man-
agement what new strategies the firm would pursue if money were no
object, and report the results back to the House of Commons.96 Nor was
the National Enterprise Board equipped to diagnose BL's disease and
prescribe a remedy, since it dealt with BL's managers at arm's length.
Moreover, although BL officials filed reports with the NEB, the
NEB-in sharp contrast to Sumitomo Bank-had no staff with particular
expertise in the automobile industry.
The four sets of rescuers also differed considerably in their ability to
affect a change in management or impose a new direction on the firm.
Both the Sumitomo Bank and Dresdner Bank took the initiative in remov-
ing top managers who had presided over the firms' deepening problems
and found new managers to replace them. The Sumitomo Bank continued
to maintain tight control over Toyo Kogyo's rescue; the Dresdner Bank
had a less direct role. At British Leyland, the National Enterprise Board
selected the company's chief executives, but had no direct role in manag-
ing the company; the banks played no part. In the Chrysler case, the gov-
ernment also initiated the change by making it clear to Chrysler's board of
directors that a management change was a precondition for a loan guaran-
tee. The government, however, had no direct role in selecting a successor
or in managing the company. As with BL, the banks to which Chrysler
was indebted played no part.
These differences are attributable largely to differences in the relation-
ships between banks, companies, and governments in the four nations, a
subject to which we now turn.
95. Manufacturers Hanover Interview, supra note 33.
96. See generally RYDER REPORT, supra note 16.
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1. Financial Linkages: Japan
In Japan, the lead bank for a company plays a key role in that com-
pany's long-term development, as well as in the long-term development of
other companies in the same industrial group. Banks are permitted to lend
substantial portions of their capital to individual companies, and may also
hold up to five percent of the outstanding shares of any company. Other
companies within the industrial group also hold shares in the bank and in
one another.9" In 1975, at the start of Toyo Kogyo's crisis, the Sumitomo
Bank was responsible for more than sixteen percent of Toyo Kogyo's ac-
cumulated debt and it held five percent of Toyo Kogyo's shares. Toyo
Kogyo held three percent of the shares of the bank. Given these relation-
ships, it is not surprising that Toyo Kogyo routinely shared confidential
information with the bank, and that when the crisis occurred Kohei
Matsuda, the company's president, put up only minor resistance to the
bank's rapid takeover.
In addition to close relations to companies, Japanese banks are linked
tightly to government agencies-the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, and the central bank. Banks are the
primary intermediaries between savers and borrowers, but the banks must
rely on the central bank for some of their capital. Because government
officials set interest rates at the central bank lower than the demand for
funds otherwise would dictate, the banks must depend on the discretion of
the central bankers and government authorities for the amount of funds
they receive. This "window guidance" makes bank officials particularly
sensitive to the inclinations of policymakers and politicians.9" In the Toyo
Kogyo case it was clear that government officials were concerned about
the firm's future and wanted to restore its competitiveness, but they also
wanted to preserve jobs.
These two binding relationships-between the lead bank and its client
companies on the one hand, and the lead bank and the government on the
other-make the lead bank one of the major channels between government
and individual companies in Japan. Rescues of companies in distress are
timely and effective largely because of this deeply-entrenched public role
of the lead bank. Commenting on the Sumitomo Bank's rescue of Toyo
Kogyo, one of the bank executives who had temporarily managed the
troubled firm explained:
97. See Anti-monopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act, art. 11 (Japan), reproduced in Z. KITA-
GAWA, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 7a-16 (1984).
98. See J. ZYSMAN, GOVERNMENTS, MARKETS, AND GROWTH: FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND THE
POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 248-50 (1983).
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[I]n Japan, banks are private profit-making operations. But at the
same time, banks have a social obligation to make sure that their
clients are healthy. Had Sumitomo Bank merely tried to get its loan
to Toyo Kogyo repaid, it might have succeeded by forcing the com-
pany into bankruptcy. But the bank would have been criticized by
society. It would have gotten a reputation for being unreliable. One
of the bank's goals is to avoid that kind of criticism.99
2. Financial Linkages: West Germany
The relationship between banks and companies in West Germany is
similar to that in Japan. West German banks exercise extraordinary con-
trol over company access to capital; there are few other institutions which
channel savings to borrowers.100 By law, the banks can represent share-
holders who deposit their shares with the banks. 11 Because only the
banks are allowed to trade on the floor of the West German stock ex-
changes, and therefore have the best knowledge of stock performance,
most shareholders take advantage of this service. In 1974, the latest date
for which such data are available, West German banks held proxies for
sixty-three percent of the shares of the nation's seventy-four largest pub-
licly-held companies. 0 2 Banks are also permitted to purchase directly up
to 100% of the shares of a company,"'0 although it is considered impru-
dent for them to invest substantial portions of their capital in any single
company.
As a result of these linkages, the banks in West Germany control a
majority of the shares of companies to which they lend money. In 1974,
for example, banks were represented on practically all of the supervisory
boards of the seventy-four largest companies in the nation, and bank rep-
resentatives chaired half of them.'0 4 Control is further centralized in West
Germany's three largest banks-the Deutsche, Commerz, and Dresdner
-which in 1974 supplied two-thirds of the bankers chairing such super-
visory boards and voted thirty-five percent of the outstanding shares of the
largest companies105
The banks' control of AEG-Telefunken fits this pattern. At the height
of the firm's crisis, the Dresdner Bank was its chief creditor; the bank also
99. Yamada Interview, supra note 28.
100. See J. CARRINGTON & G. EDWARDS, FINANCING INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT 117, 120 (1979).
101. Aktiengesetz § 135, 1965 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 1089 (W. Ger.).
102. SCHRIFTENREICHE DES BUNDESMINISTERIUMS DER FINANZEN, BERICHT DER STUDIENKOM.
MISSION, GRUNDSATZFRAGEN DER KREDIDWIRTSCHAFT, heft 28 (1979).
103. Aktiengesetz § 135, 1965 BGBI 1 1089 (W. Ger.).
104. SCHRIFTENREICHE DES BUNDESMINISTERIUMS DER FINANZEN, supra note 102, heft 28.
105. Id.
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directly held more than eighteen percent of the company's outstanding
shares. With the proxies of AEG shares deposited with the bank or lent to
it by other banks, the Dresdner Bank effectively controlled a majority of
the company's shares. This explains why Hans Friderichs, the bank's
chief executive, also came to be the chairman of AEG's supervisory board.
It also helps explain why the bank assumed responsibility for arranging
first the "private" bailout of the firm, and then the public one: the bank
simply had too much at stake in AEG to let the firm go under all at once.
In these respects, the relationship between the Dresdner Bank and
AEG paralleled that between the Sumitomo Bank and Toyo Kogyo.
There were important differences, however. The Dresdner Bank did not
have access to the same quality of information about AEG that Sumitomo
had about Toyo Kogyo, nor at quite such an early stage of the crisis..The
Dresdner Bank could neither place bank officers in key positions within
AEG, as Sumitomo had done with Toyo Kogyo, nor accomplish the dra-
matic changes that the Sumitomo Bank managed at Toyo Kogyo in a rela-
tively short time.
The ability of Dresdner Bank to control outcomes at AEG was also
compromised by divisions on AEG's supervisory board. As AEG's finan-
cial position deteriorated in the middle and late 1970's, its board was una-
ble to agree on a diagnosis or a plan of action. Not trusting the. bank
representatives to act in the best interest of labor, the representatives of
labor on the board withheld certain information in their possession.1"6 Not
trusting labor to maintain confidentiality, management and the bank rep-
resentatives also withheld information."0 7 As the crisis deepened in 1979,
the board was deadlocked. The Dresdner Bank refused to seek assistance
from the government because it feared that such a move would give labor
a greater voice in the management of the company, and ultimately in the
management of the economy. It therefore turned for help to other banks,
industrial companies, and insurance companies, while labor simultane-
ously sought help from the government. Even by 1982, when the bank
was forced to go to the government, it negotiated separately from labor. In
short, the ongoing power struggle in which the Dresdner Bank found it-
self impaired its ability to manage AEG's rescue.
In addition, it is important to note that West German banks are not
politically accountable for their major decisions0 8 despite all their power
over the economy. The Dresdner Bank thus never assumed the same pub-
106. Interview with an official of the Dresdner Bank (name withheld by request), in Cambridge,
Mass. (Jan. 12, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Dresdner Interview].
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., J. ZYSMAN, supra note 98, at 260.
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lic responsibilities for West German economic development that the
Sumitomo Bank assumed for Japanese development. Unlike the Sumitomo
Bank, the Dresdner Bank was not an agent of government policy.
3. Financial Fragmentation: United States
Banks in the United States maintain arm's-length relationships both
with companies and with the government. This helps to explain why
Chrysler's lead bank, Manufacturers Hanover, had neither early warning
of Chrysler's problems, nor the ability to solve the problems even if it had
received warning. The arm's length relationship between banks and com-
panies is required by law. In general, financial institutions in the United
States may not hold shares in separate business enterprises." 9 National
banks, bank holding companies and insurance companies are typically
permitted to engage (either directly or through a subsidiary) only in busi-
nesses bearing a close relationship to traditional banking or insurance
functions." 0 In addition, the Glass-Steagall Act limits the role of commer-
cial banks in underwriting and purchasing securities and specifically pro-
hibits them from making investments in corporate securities for their own
account."' Further restrictions on bank investments were embodied in the
Bank Holding Company Act, which was designed to extend the principle
of separation of banking from commerce to entities that own or control
banks.' Similar restrictions on investments by state chartered banks exist
109. The Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1982), generally prohibits bank hold-
ing companies from engaging in nonbank activities.
110. See, e.g., Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982) (a bank holding com-
pany may invest in a company which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve determines "to
be so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto");
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 96.1 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1984) (banks may "exercise all such incidental
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking"); N.Y. INS. LAW § 46-al(a) (Mc-
Kinney 1971 & Supp. 1984) (insurance companies may invest in subsidiaries engaged in insurance or
investment related business); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38-146a (1983) (Connecticut mutual life insurance
companies can invest in subsidiaries engaged in insurance or investment-related business).
111. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982). Under 12 U.S.C. § 335, the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 24 also apply
to restrict the investment of state member banks of the Federal Reserve System.
112. Section 4(c)(5) of the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5) (1982),
permits a bank holding company to invest in "shares which are of the kinds and amounts eligible for
investment" by a national bank under 12 U.S.C. § 24 (thus embodying the limited exceptions to the
Glass-Steagall Act). Section 4(c)(6) of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1982), permits a holding
company to own no more than five percent of the outstanding voting shares of any company. Although
an equity investment of up to five percent might be insignificant, investments of five percent each by a
number of bank holding companies could be substantial in the aggregate. However, there is a substan-
tial risk that such joint investments of less than five percent each could be unprotected by § 4(c)(6).
See 12 C.F.R. 225.137 (1984) ("the exemption was not intended to allow a group of holding compa-
nies, through concerted action, to engage in an activity as entrepreneurs"). Section 4(c)(2) of the
BHCA provides an exemption to bank holding companies or any of their subsidiaries for shares
acquired in satisfaction of "a debt previously contracted." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(2) (1982). Unless such
shares represent less than five percent of the total outstanding shares, they may only be held for a
period of two years (which may be extended at the discretion of the Federal Reserve Board).
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under various state laws. " ' Although insurance companies are generally
permitted to make equity investments under state laws, such laws fre-
quently require the investments to be made in corporations with a speci-
fied level of financial performance and strength. " 4
In addition to these limitations on equity ownership, banks in the
United States may not extend loans which exceed ten percent of the
bank's capital to an individual company.11 5 Moreover, banks generally
may not do business in more than one state. " 6 On the other hand, special-
ized investment banks are permitted to hold shares," 7 but, because they
are not allowed to accept deposits, they have comparatively few resources
to invest. Such banks function primarily to maintain secondary markets
for commercial paper and corporate bonds.
Most of these restrictions originated in the 1930's to help ensure bank
solvency and credibility, and some are gradually succumbing to the forces
of deregulation and competition." 8 These restrictions have had the effect
of fragmenting and decentralizing financial intermediaries in the United
States, so that no large company is particularly dependent upon any single
financial institution, or vice versa. Chrysler was indebted to more than
400 separate banks; it also had substantial amounts of commercial paper
and corporate bonds outstanding. By the same token, even Manufacturers
Hanover, Chrysler's chief lender, regarded Chrysler as but one of a large
number of clients about whom the bank knew relatively little." 9 The loan
officer in charge of the Chrysler account had no particular knowledge
about Chrysler or the automobile industry; indeed, his portfolio of ac-
113. For example, New York banks generally may not purchase the stock of other corporations.
Although Section 97.5 of the New York Banking Law provides that a New York bank may acquire
"[s]o much of the capital stock of any other corporation as may be specifically authorized by the laws
of this state or by resolution of the banking board upon a three-fifths vote of all its members," the
investments which are "specifically authorized" are not numerous. A provision similar to the exemp-
tion in 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(2).is also present in the New York statute, N.Y. BANKING LAW § 97.5
(McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1984).
114. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1982) (states given authority to regulate the
business of insurance). Under New York law, an insurance company may not invest in common stock
unless the issuing institution earned enough in the aggregate to pay a dividend of four percent on all
stocks and shares outstanding for each of the seven years preceding the acquisition by an insurer. N.Y.
INS. LAW § 81(13)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1984).- Various limitations are also placed on such equity
investments in terms of a percentage of the insurer's total assets. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 81(13)(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1984).
115. This restriction applies only to national banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(2) (1982).
116. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1982).
117. Banking Act of 1933, §§ 20-21, 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377, 378 (1982); see also 4 F. SOLOMON,
W. SCHLICHTING, T. RICE & J. COOPER, BANKING LAW § 80.22(3) (1984) [hereinafter cited as F.
SOLOMON]; Clark & Summers, Judicial Interpretation of Glass Steagall: The Need for Legislative
Action, 97 BANKING L.J. 721 (1980).
118. See, e.g., Nationwide Banking: Barriers Fall, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1983, at 29, col. 3;
America's Debut in Offshore Banking, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1981, at Fl, col. 2.
119. Interview with Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. loan officer (name withheld by request),
in New York City (Jan. 10, 1984).
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counts was arranged geographically, rather than by industrial sector.12
He periodically reviewed Chrysler's balance sheets and income statements
to assure that they technically conformed to bank credit requirements. He
was not trained to analyze financial projections or strategic plans, even
had Chrysler been willing to give them to him. " '
Even if bank managers possessed the skills, knowledge, and authority
needed to deal with problems such as those experienced by Chrysler, it
was not clear that they would have wanted to become deeply involved in
developing a solution. Financial institutions in the U.S. which wish to
participate in the debtor's management risk creating a relationship that
will cause them to be deemed "in control" of the debtor. This may subject
them to substantial liability under United States bankruptcy, securities
and tax laws. 22 Even if a lender is not actually in control of a debtor,
allegations that such control exists can result in expensive litigation.
In addition, corporate laws of various states draw a relatively sharp
distinction between the fiduciary duties owed creditors and those owed
shareholders.' 23 Chrysler managers had a legal responsibility to act in the
best interest of Chrysler shareholders, not in the best interest of the bank's
shareholders. 24 Had the bank required as a condition of a loan that
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Under the Bankruptcy Code, "insiders" are subject to possible recovery preferences during
the one year period preceding the commencement of a bankruptcy case, while other persons are sub-
ject to such recoveries only during the ninety-day period preceding the commencement of a case. 11
U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1982). An "insider" is defined to include a director, officer, or person in control
of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(25) (1982). Moreover, the bankruptcy court has the power to
subordinate one claim to another on considerations of equity and fairness. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1982).
A creditor in control of a debtor can expect that it will be met with allegations that its claim should be
equitably subordinated if not disallowed.
Although there is no specific statutory definition of "control" in either the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77b (1982), or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1982), the Securities
and Exchange Commission broadly defines control as "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power
to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through the
ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. 230.405 (1984). Therefore, a
creditor which directly participates in or selects management runs the risk of being considered to be in
control of the debtor. See, e.g., In re Falstaff Brewing Corp. Antitrust Litig., 441 F. Supp. 62 (E.D.
Mo. 1977) (lender that controls the daily affairs of borrower corporation can be held liable for corpo-
ration's Securities Exchange Act of 1934 violations).
123. The fiduciary duty of corporate directors and officers to stockholders includes a duty to act
loyally, in good faith, and without assuming any position in conflict with the interest of the corpora-
tion. 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 761 (1940). No such fiduciary duty automatically exists with respect to
creditors; directors and officers are merely agents of the corporation. 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 837
(1940).
124. See, e.g., Newman v. Forward Lands, Inc., 418 F.Supp. 135, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (the
directors "had a duty to exercise in managing [the company's] affairs, but the duty was owed only to
the corporation itself and not to" those outside the corporation); Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio, 39 Colo.
App. 95, 561 P.2d 367 (1977) (managers of solvent corporation are primarily responsible to the cor-
poration, though managers of insolvent corporation may be trustees for the entity and for its
creditors).
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Chrysler change its management or take some other action that might
harm Chrysler shareholders-for example, selling off a valuable property
to pay off corporate debts-Chrysler's shareholders could have a right of
action against the bank.
2 5
These fiduciary obligations obviously constrain the banks from asserting
control over distressed companies. It is interesting to note that during the
years immediately preceding Chrysler's crisis, the chairman of the board
of Manufacturers Hanover, Gabriel Hauge, also was a member of
Chrysler's board of directors-an interlocking relationship of the sort
which flourished between Sumitomo Bank and Toyo Kogyo, and
Dresdner Bank and AEG-Telefunken. Unlike the situations in Japan and
West Germany, however, this relationship was purely cosmetic. It may
have impressed a few shareholders or smaller creditors, but as a practical
matter Hauge had to be careful not to pass information he learned at the
Chrysler board meetings to the commercial loan department of the bank,
lest he place himself in a conflict of interest and thereby invite a suit by
Chrysler shareholders.'
The U.S. government, like the West German government, has no par-
ticular substantive authority over the banks, although it closely regulates
them to ensure solvency and prudence. The government collects a large
amount of information about individual companies in tax filings, securities
filings, reviews of regulatory compliance, and reviews of proposed mergers
and acquisitions. Most of these data, however, are in the wrong form to
provide adequate warning that a major company is in trouble, or are dis-
persed among so many agencies that they often cannot be reconstructed
without contravening laws which protect confidentiality.'2 7 This inade-
quacy explains why, when Chrysler came to the White House seeking
help, the Carter Administration had to commission a variety of studies by
125. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.
1984) (creditor held liable to debtor for damages resulting from creditor's efforts to prevent one indi-
vidual from becoming chief executive officer and to retain in his place management more sympathetic
to the creditor's concerns); Connor v. Great Western Say. and Loan Ass'n, 68 Cal.2d 850, 864-66,
447 P. 2d 609, 616-17, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376-77 (1968) (lender became participant in home con-
struction enterprise by entering business relationships with the developer as well as lending capital,
and thus was liable to the home buyers for structural defects).
126. Interview with Paul Hunn, Vice-President, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., in Cam-
bridge, Mass. (March 7, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Hunn Interview].
127. Most agencies forbid inter-agency and inter-governmental flow of information. For example,
in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress provided that all tax returns and information were confi-
dential and, thus, not routinely subject to disclosure to federal or state agencies. 26 U.S.C. § 6103
(1982). Similarly, information gathered by the Federal Trade Commission is confidential and may be
shared with other federal agencies only in disaggregated form, with limitations on the use of such
data. 15 U.S.C. § 57b-2 (1982). The Bureau of the Census may not disseminate census data in any
form whereby an individual establishment might be identified, nor use the data for other than statisti-
cal purposes. 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1982).
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private accountants, investment bankers, and management consultants in
order to elicit useful information about the company's plight and future
prospects, rather than rely on data already in the government's possession.
4. Financial Fragmentation: Great Britain
If anything, British banks are even further removed from the companies
to which they lend money than are U.S. banks. The City of London, Brit-
ain's "Wall Street," is oriented to an international financial market in
which capital is highly mobile. As a result, financial relationships are
fragmented. Loans tend to be short-term (more than eighty percent are
due to be paid within a year)," 8 and British companies typically finance
their expansion through retained earnings and new issues of stock.' 29 In
addition, the fiduciary obligations governing banks and company manag-
ers are at least as strict as those in the United States.1 30 For these reasons,
the banks play no significant role in monitoring or rescuing large firms in
distress. British Leyland's major creditors had no inside information about
the company's mounting problems, and no particular capacity to do any-
thing about them. 3'
128. J. CARRINGTON & G. EDWARDS, supra note 100, at 129.
129. J. ZYSMAN, supra note 98, at 193.
130. For a comprehensive analysis of fiduciary duties in England, see H. SHELDON & P. FIDLER,
SHELDON & FIDLER'S PRACTICE AND LAW OF BANKING 35-65 (11 th ed. 1982).
131. Although the relationships between a troubled company and its bank, and the bank and the
government, are more attenuated in Great Britain than in our other examples, the relationship be-
tween distressed companies and the goverment is closer. Britain is the only nation of the four to have
embraced public ownership as a general solution to the problem of large companies in distress, or to
have permanently created a special institution of government to oversee such rescues. Perhaps the two
phenomena are related: with the banks unwilling to back up such companies or help oversee their
revival, the burden has fallen entirely upon government to meet resulting political demands for special
assistance.
The National Enterprise Board, which oversaw most of the rescue of British Leyland, was con-
ceived as a kind of state "holding company" whose purpose, according to its guidelines, was to "com-
bine the advantages of public sector financial resources and the private sector's entrepreneurial ap-
proach to decisionmaking." NATIONAL ENTERPRISE BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 1977, at
56-59 (1978). Board members were appointed by the Secretary of State for Industry; the director and
deputy of the board during this period were drawn from industry, and four of the nine part-time
members were trade unionists. The board was authorized to make loans to troubled companies only at
"commercial" rates of interest, and only to companies that eventually could become viable on their
own. Lord Don Ryder, its first director, who presided over the initial stages of the British Leyland
rescue, stated that "it is not part of NEB's policy to prop up non-viable companies simply to maintain
jobs." NATIONAL ENTERPRISE BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1976), cited in W. GRANT, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 106 n.13 (1982).
In addition, the NEB was not equipped to anticipate problem companies or to monitor and super-
vise the restructuring of the sort that a large company such as BL required. The Board had no
particular knowledge of individual companies or industries; its relationship with BL, for example, was
entirely by way of the chief executives whom the Board selected. The government could only approve
or disapprove company decisions on the basis of limited financial data. Every request for funds or for
additional funds, therefore, became a choice between acceding to the company or allowing it to fail.
W. GRANT, supra, at 104-110.
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B. Sacrifice
Even if a rescuer has early and reliable information about a company's
growing problems and asserts managerial control over the company, the
"'rescue" still is more likely to be an orderly shrink than a substantial
shift, unless the other participants cooperate. In particular, workers must
be willing to accept lower pay at least for a time, and to shift to new jobs
within the company. Lenders must maintain their outstanding loans even
in the face of higher risks, and perhaps advance additional credit. Without
these sacrifices, new funds from the rescuer merely preserve the status quo
for a time-maintaining existing wages and commercial credit while the
company gradually shrinks.
The four cases represent a spectrum of sacrifice, with Toyo Kogyo and
British Leyland once again occupying the extremes. Toyo Kogyo workers
accepted major pay cuts, and many of them agreed to transfer temporarily
to automobile dealers hundreds of miles away from Hiroshima. Similarly,
Toyo Kogyo's banks, insurance companies, and suppliers agreed to main-
tain loans or advance credit. On the other hand, British Leyland workers
resisted pay cuts and changes in work rules and job classifications, while
private lenders called in their loans and refused to make new ones. AEG
and Chrysler lie in between: AEG's lenders sacrificed, but its workers
balked at major reductions in wages and benefits; Chrysler's lenders and
workers both sacrificed, but only to a limited extent. This section attempts
to account for these differences in the degree of sacrifice parties were will-
ing to undertake.
1. Financial Interdependency
One explanation is found in the structures of national financial mar-
kets. For the same reasons that lead banks in Japan and West Germany
receive more timely and detailed information about their clients than
"arm's-length" banks in the United States and Britain, they also are more
committed to maintaining their clients. In these countries, even a gradual
liquidation would be likely to impair the value of the bank's equity and
jeopardize its major loans, both with the distressed company and also with
a larger network of suppliers and industrial purchasers which depend on
the company. These lead banks therefore are more likely to finance re-
source shifts than banks in the United States or Great Britain.
In addition, these lead banks are linked financially and strategically to
other banks, insurance companies, and trade creditors. The lead banks,
therefore, can facilitate the agreement of these other lenders to maintain
their own outstanding loans to the troubled company, and even on occa-
sion to provide new financing. These interdependent networks function as
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systems of mutual aid. Lenders, in effect, insure one another against rela-
tively sudden market changes which might threaten their survival.
In 1975, at the start of Toyo Kogyo's crisis, the Sumitomo keiretsu as a
whole held almost eleven percent of Toyo Kogyo's shares and Toyo Kogyo
had considerable holdings in other group members. The Sumitomo Bank
also held nine percent of the shares of C. Itoh, the trading company
outside the group on which the bank later called to help Toyo Kogyo. In
addition to this financial tie, several members of the Sumitomo keiretsu
supplied parts to Toyo Kogyo, or had common technological needs and
therefore were engaged in joint ventures or joint purchasing arrange-
ments. These financial and strategic ties enabled the bank to spread the
cost and risk of the Toyo Kogyo rescue among many cooperating institu-
tions. They also enabled the bank to make credible guarantees about the
company's survival and thereby reduce the perceived riskiness on new
loans. Given all these interdependencies, the Sumitomo Bank's announce-
ment that it would stand by Toyo Kogyo made other lenders more willing
to maintain their outstanding loans and commercial credits with the
company.' 32
Like Sumitomo in the Toyo Kogyo case, the Dresdner Bank was able
to call on other banks and insurance companies to help AEG. For some of
these participants the stake was more direct: twenty four of these banks
held almost fifty percent of the AEG's outstanding shares; the Deutsche
Bank alone held nine percent. The Dresdner Bank could also count on the
support of a small group of industrial companies. Although this group
was not as formally organized and integrated as the Sumitomo Group, its
ties were similarly strategic and financial. Through its close relationship
with AEG, the Dresdner Bank gradually had developed expertise in the
electronics and capital goods industries in which AEG competed; the bank
therefore organized its industrial loan department along these sectors. 33
In this way, over time, many AEG suppliers and industrial purchasers
became clients of the bank. These interdependencies were reinforced as
the bank took equity positions in these companies.
There was no similar, mutually dependent network on which Chrysler
or British Leyland could rely. As we have seen, British Leyland's banks
backed out early in the crisis.'" Chrysler's banks agreed to extend the
maturity of some notes in 1980, and in 1981 they agreed to convert ap-
proximately one-third of the company's outstanding debt to equity and to
write down another one-third. The banks, however, demanded full pay-
132. Yamada Interview, supra note 28; Maeda Interview, supra note 58.
133. Dresdner Interview, supra note 106.
134. See supra at 171.
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ment on the final one-third, and throughout the crisis, they adamantly
refused to extend new loans to the company. The few concessions they did
make came largely as a result of pressure from the Treasury Department
and the Federal Reserve Board.
To some extent, the comparative reticence of U.S. and British banks
can be explained by differing auditing practices and financial regulations.
Auditors and bank examiners in Japan and West Germany take a far
more lenient view of non-performing loans than do their colleagues in the
United States and Britain. In Japan and West Germany, debtors may
violate loan covenants or miss interest payments without necessarily forc-
ing the bank to write down the asset on its books. Because the debtor may
well shift into a more profitable line of business, the loan is not necessa-
rily considered to be riskier, or of lesser value, than it was before.135 For
the same reason, the bank also may advance new loans to such a company
and carry the new loan as an asset.
In the United States and Britain, on the other hand, bank auditors and
regulators are more concerned about the risk of inadequate capitalization.
A bank typically is required to write down its non-performing loans;' it
also may have to expand its loan-loss reserves in coming years. These
items are charged off against earnings. If the distressed company subse-
quently repays the loan and any lost interest, these payments can be ap-
plied against whatever provisions have been made for the losses.' 37 In the
interim, however, the damage has already been done to the bank's re-
ported profits, thereby impairing its ability to raise more capital. By the
same token, new loans to a distressed company are scrutinized carefully;
the bank probably would not be able to carry them as assets.
This cautious approach obviously makes banks more reluctant to accept
temporary sacrifices. A Manufacturers Hanover vice president in charge
of problem loans explained that the bank would never extend a new loan
to a distressed company except as part of a plan to reduce the bank's
overall embedded debt. Indeed, the bank followed this rule with respect to
Chrysler and other banks took the same position." 8 Such a rule ultimately
favors shrinkage over shifts.
Financial structures are only part of the story, of course. To understand
why sacrifices were more widespread in Toyo Kogyo than in British Ley-
land-with AEG and Chrysler in between-we also need to examine the
organization of labor.
135. Yamada Interview, supra note 28; Hunn Interview, supra note 126; see also Commercial
Code, art. 281 (Japan), reproduced in Z. KITAGAWA, supra note 97, app. 5a-104.
136. See F. SOLOMON, supra note 117, at § 44.08(2).
137. Hunn Interview, supra note 126.
138. Id.
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2. Labor Interdependency
By a variety of formal and informal rules, Japanese workers are tightly
linked to their companies. The links are somewhat more attenuated in
large West German companies. In the United States and Great Britain,
such links are almost non-existent. These patterns are evident in the ways
unions are organized, in the relations between unionized workers and
managers, and in ways of providing job security and regulating wage dif-
ferentials, among workers.
In each of the four countries, workers are organized at several levels. At
the bottom are local shop-floor organizations, which are aggregated into
company unions or affiliates, then into industry unions, and finally into
multi-industry labor federations. The locus of control differs in each coun-
try, however. In Japan, company unions predominate; most of the impor-
tant decisions about wages and working-conditions are made at this
level."3 9 Company unions also are important in West Germany. 4" Unlike
their Japanese counterparts, West German workers also participate
through their unions in national negotiations over wages and
macroeconomic policies. 4 ' Company unions are less important in the
United States and Great Britain. In the United States, most bargaining
occurs at the level of the industry union.' 42 In Britain, bargaining occurs
both at the shop floor and at the industry level. 43
Formal relations between managers and unionized workers within the
company are structured quite differently in the four countries. In most
large Japanese companies there is no sharp distinction between supervi-
sors and blue-collar workers. Japanese companies typically employ elabo-
rate systems of joint consultation through which confidential management
information is shared with lower-level employees. Japanese company un-
ions include many white-collar supervisors, and the links between man-
agement and labor are reinforced by the fact that many company directors
were once union leaders.' 4 In West Germany, distinctions between pro-
duction workers and supervisors are more clearly drawn, yet there exist a
variety of consultative mechanisms. By law, union representatives occupy
139. See, e.g., W. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 2 (1984); R. CLARK,
THE JAPANESE COMPANY 50-55, 98-139 (1979).
140. E. CULLINGFORD, TRADE UNIONS IN WEST GERMANY 22 (1976); C. HANSON, S. JACKSON &
D. MILLER, THE CLOSED SHOP: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN PUBLIC POLICY AND TRADE UNION SE-
CURITY IN BRITAIN, THE USA AND WEST GERMANY 191 (1982).
141. E. CULLINGFORD, supra note 140, at 17, 21.
142. See E. SMITH, TRADE UNIONS IN THE DEVELOPED ECONOMIES 169-70, 172-73 (1981).
143. See K. COATES & T. TOPHAM, TRADE UNIONS IN BRITAIN 166-67 (1980).
144. W. GOULD, supra note 139, at 4 ("of 313 major Japanese companies ... 74.1 percent had
at least one executive director who once had served as a labor union leader"). See also R. CLARK,
supra note 139, at 109.
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one-third to one-half of the seats on company supervisory boards, which
have responsibility for major decisions affecting the company.145 In the
United States and Great Britain, on the other hand, managers and work-
ers are sharply separated.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), for example, presumes a
fundamental conflict between managers and employees. Section 8(a)(2)
makes it an unfair labor practice for employers to "dominate or interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contrib-
ute financial or other support to it."' 46 This provision has been construed
broadly to bar management from supporting certain formal mechanisms of
worker participation.14 By the same token, supervisory employees are
excluded from the provisions of the NLRA on the theory that the
supervisor-employee relationship is necessarily adversarial and supervisors
represent management; union membership, it is assumed, would involve
them in a conflict of interest. 48 An American employer is under no obli-
gation to open its financial records to its unions unless the company spe-
cifically pleads an inability to pay during collective bargaining. 4 Nor do
employers have a duty to bargain about management decisions to close
part of an operation.' The cumulative effect of these rules is to maintain
an arm's length, adversarial relationship between management and
employees.
Like American labor law, British labor law seems to presume a funda-
mental tension and separation between management and labor. For exam-
ple, although British employers are obligated to disclose to the trade un-
ions information without which the union representatives' collective
bargaining efforts would be severely hampered, 5' this obligation is subject
145. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, 1952 BGBI I 681 (W. Ger.); Mitbestimmungsgesetz, 1976 BGBI
1 1153 (W. Ger.).
146. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
147. See, e.g., Homemaker Shops, Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 441 (1982); Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 322 (1976); Midwest Piping and Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945). When
the United Auto Workers' president, Douglas Fraser, took a place on Chrysler's board of directors as
a condition of union cooperation with the troubled company, the general counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board declined to issue a complaint. The general counsel did so largely because the
appointment created no financial ties between the company and the union. See N.L.R.B. Advice
Memorandum, Case 7-CB-4815 (Oct. 22, 1980).
148. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947),
appears to have formed the rationale for the exclusion of supervisors under the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments to the NLRA. In that case, Douglas argued that foremen should not be included as
"employees" because a foreman's act-if attributable to management-might be an unfair labor prac-
tice, although-if the foreman were characterized as an "employee"-management would not be simi-
larly liable. See id. at 496-497 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
149. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
150. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
151. Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71, §§ 17-21.
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to numerous qualifications and exceptions.1"2 The ability of workers to
obtain data from management is further compromised-and, thus, the
separation between workers and management is preserved-by the uncer-
tainty of the procedures for enforcing whatever obligations do exist.15
British employers are required to give trade unions advance notice of and
the reasons for plant closings; however, they, like their American counter-
parts, are under no affirmative duty to bargain over such managerial
decisions.54
Finally, important differences also exist among these four countries in
ways of providing job security and regulating wage differentials among
workers. In Japan, employees of most large companies are hired directly
from high school and expect to remain with the company until retirement;
their wages and benefits depend largely on their age.' 55 In West Germany
job security is built into most labor contracts within large firms, as are
generous severance payments in the event of necessary layoffs. Wage and
benefit levels rise with the number of years the employee has served. In
both West Germany and Japan, employers are required to provide em-
ployees with at least one month's advance notice of a plant shutdown." 6
In addition, employees have substantial rights in the event of an em-
ployer's insolvency: In West Germany, employees have a priority in bank-
ruptcy, entitling them to sixty-eight percent average pay for one year; in
Japan, they receive full wages for two years and eighty percent of the first
three months' salary is provided by the state."'5
In the United States and Great Britain, job security and relative wages
have been more closely linked to job classifications, work rules, and se-
niority; rights and benefits vary with the category in which a worker is
classified. Particularly in the United States, income-security provisions
have substituted for job security. The government administers unemploy-
152. Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71, § 18. One of these exceptions excuses the em-
ployer from disclosure "where the compilation or assembly [of the requested information] would in-
volve an amount of work or expenditure out of useful proporation to the value of the information in
the conduct of collective bargaining." Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71, § 18(2)(b).
153. See P. DAVIES & M. FREEDLAND, LABOUR LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 154 (1979); see also
Civil Service Union v. Central Arbitration Committee, [1980] INDUS. REL. L. REP. 274 (giving a
broad reading to the exceptions to the disclosure requirement).
154. The elimination of jobs through plant closings in England is governed by the Redundancy
Payments Act of 1965, codified in the Employment Protection Consolidation Act, 1978, ch. 44, §§ 81-
92. The Redundancy Payments Act was designed to increase managerial freedom in the elimination of
jobs, by providing lump sum payments to workers to make the dismissals more palatable. P. DAVIES
& M. FREEDLAND, supra note 153, at 166. Although constraints on managerial discretion were im-
posed in 1975, see Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71, §§ 99-107, British managers remain free
of the duty to bargain over plant closings.
155. W. GOULD, supra note 139, at 1-11.
156. See generally I. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, MINDING AMERICA'S BUSINESS 143-54 (1983).
157. Id.
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ment insurance, which pays approximately sixty percent of previous
wages. 58 In many industries these benefits have been supplemented by
unemployment benefits built into wage contracts.' 59 If the company can-
not then offer "suitable employment," workers who are at least forty-five
years old can collect regular pensions, plus $400 monthly supplements
until they become eligible for Social Security.
These different patterns of organization presumably influence workers'
willingness to sacrifice in order to help a distressed company shift. Such
shifts require flexibility in wages, benefits, and work responsibilities as
alternatives to layoffs. Shifts also require external inflexibility-meaning
that employees tend not to move between firms, but to remain with the
same firm during the course of their career. This combination results in a
great deal of mutual dependence between the company and the employee;
both sides can draw upon a reservoir of trust and simultaneously rely on
the discipline of future dealings. In consequence, unionized workers will
be more willing to reduce wages and shift jobs during bad times than they
would be otherwise.'60
Japan's system of company negotiations, combined with lifetime job se-
curity (in the largest firms) and age-based wages, is the most internally
flexible of the four. When a Japanese company suddenly begins to lose
money, it can quickly reduce its workers' wages and benefits, and shift job
responsibilities. The Japanese system is also externally rigid: with life-
time employment as the norm, it is difficult for a worker to leave one
large company and find employment with another. Like those of the lead
banks, workers' fates are linked to that of the company. Toyo Kogyo's
company union accepted pay raises lower than those received by workers
158. Unemployment insurance is administered jointly by the federal and state governments. Be-
cause the states administer the programs-setting eligibility requirements and compensation
rates-the benefits paid may vary from state to state. Most states pay unemployment benefits at a rate
equal to about sixty percent of a worker's salary prior to loss of employment, subject to certain limits.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-231a (1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 421.27(b)(1) (West Supp.
1984). The states collect taxes to pay unemployment benefits; these taxes are then paid into the fed-
eral government's Unemployment Trust Fund, from which the states are reimbursed for their expend-
itures. 42 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982). The federal government also disburses funds to the states to help pay
the costs of administering unemployment benefit programs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-503 (1982).
159. In steel, aluminum, and canmaking, for example, workers with twenty years of service are
guaranteed supplemental unemployment benefit (SUB) payments for two years, even if the union's
own SUB funds are exhausted.
160. A moment's reflection will suggest how this relationship works. Suppose that a firm's man-
agers contend that demand has declined and that workers therefore should reduce their wages. If the
workers agree, the firm can have the same work as before but at a lower cost. But why should the
workers believe the managers? They might believe them if they had built up a long-term relationship
of trust and confidence, and the managers had shared company data with the union. But if the work-
ers did not believe the claim, they could reduce the rewards to misrepresentation by refusing to cut
their wages and forcing the firm to reduce its wage bill by cutting employment instead. For a general
treatment of this subject, see Goldberg, Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts, 23
AM. BEHAV. SCI. 347 (1980).
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at other automobile companies and agreed to the transfer of 5000 workers
to Toyo Kogyo dealers.
AEG's workers were less inclined to accept wage and benefit reduc-
tions. In West Germany, national labor negotiations may have reduced
the flexibility of the company union. Officials at IG Metall, the national
union that represented many of AEG's workers, were concerned that any
concession at the company level might strengthen the hand of management
nationally, not only with regard to wages and benefits of workers in other
companies but also with regard to larger questions about the role of finan-
cial institutions in shaping economic development. AEG's workers had not
participated in planning either the initial private rescue or the subsequent
federal loan guarantee; the unions viewed both actions as disturbing
precedents.
Chrysler's workers resisted wage cuts even more adamantly. The
United Auto Workers did not want to depart from "pattern bargaining"
in which wages and benefits are established for the entire industry. Nor
was the union willing to give up work rules and job classifications, a move
which would have permitted Chrysler management to shift workers to
other responsibilities. Under the pressure of the Loan Guarantee Board,
the union ultimately acceded to wage cuts in 1981, but only after tens of
thousands of Chrysler workers already had been laid off.
Indeed, at no point in Chrylser's crisis did the union express a willing-
ness to exchange wage concessions for job guarantees. The union seniority
system may have been partly to blame for this, since the axe would fall on
younger workers with less influence in the union. The majority of union
members who voted on wage concessions knew that they were less likely
to be laid off. This dynamic was most apparent in the fall of 1982, when
Chrysler's workers were offered a no-raise, no-layoff contract. Fifty thou-
sand Chrysler workers, including 45,000 still on the job and 5000 most
recently laid off, were entitled to vote; a majority of them wanted pay
raises. But 42,000 Chrysler workers were not allowed to make this choice
between pay raises and job security. This group had been laid off for so
long that they had lost their union voting rights. Had they voted, the re-
sults might have gone the other way, and many of these laid-off workers
might have gotten their jobs back.
Workers at British Leyland were the least cooperative of all. Many of
their disputes were not with BL management, but with other workers.
With seventeen different unions arranged into 246 bargaining units, and
an elaborate system of work rules and job classifications, every negotiation
over wages and benefits for one group potentially altered the relative posi-
tions of every other group. The firm was wracked by disputes over union
jurisdictions and pay differentials. Shop stewards vied for control. With so
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many groups and individuals competing for leadership and influence, none
could risk appearing to concede too much. In the end, most of the rescue
money went to maintaining wages and providing lump-sum severance
payments. Shrinking was far easier to accomplish than shifting.
Conclusion
The broader lessons that emerge from this study must be stated with
the tentativeness they deserve. We have, after all, investigated only four
cases, and explored only some of the plausible explanations for their pat-
terns and outcomes. Nevertheless certain conclusions seem warranted.
First, the cases suggest that these sorts of large manufacturing enter-
prises are more than mere productive enterprises. They are also the cen-
ters of vast social and economic networks of suppliers, dealers, financial
institutions, employees, and service industries. They anchor communities,
define relationships, and structure social obligations. How these compa-
nies respond to crisis is therefore intimately conditioned by, and pro-
foundly affects, the way these social systems respond. When large compa-
nies that employ substantial portions of a region's workforce begin to
falter, political pressures invariably mount to "save jobs." Even if politics
did not intercede initially, rapid dissolution of such companies might so
disrupt social and economic life that governments and other institutions
would be compelled to respond. The fact that they did respond in the four
cases thus is less interesting than is the fact that they responded in very
different ways.
Second, the responses can be arranged along a continuum. Some re-
sponses merely slow down the company's inevitable shrinkage. Other re-
sponses help the company to shift its resources internally to more profita-
ble pursuits. We have looked at four examples. At the extremes, Toyo
Kogyo quickly jettisoned a relatively small number of its jobs and shifted
the rest; British Leyland slowly jettisoned most of its jobs and shifted com-
paratively few. Yet the British government intervened far more directly to
save British Leyland jobs-effectively nationalizing the company-than
did the Japanese government to save Toyo Kogyo jobs. Chrysler and
AEG both lie midway on this continuum; both companies shrunk consid-
erably after they were "rescued," although the Chrysler and the AEG
loan guarantees also were premised on "saving jobs."
Third, the pattern of response seems related to the laws and detailed
understandings which shape relationships between management, finance,
and labor. There are other possible explanations, of course. Some have to
do with the overall pace of economic activity surrounding these companies.
Presumably shifts are easier to negotiate when the economy is expanding
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and all participants can anticipate a larger income in the future. Culture
also obviously plays a part; shifts are probably easier to arrange if people
think of themselves more as group members-as in Japan-than as iso-
lated individuals-as in the United States.
Between economics and culture, however, lies a detailed set of laws,
regulations, and social norms which frame institutional relationships.
These formal and informal rules both establish and represent responsibili-
ties. They define institutional loyalties and shape patterns of negotiation
among different groups of people. They thereby give rise to different types
of transactions-some between parties that perceive their dealings to be
only temporary and convenient; others, between parties whose ties to one
another arise from perceived mutual dependencies stretching over long pe-
riods of time.
At one extreme we find companies which are tied to lead banks, and
through the lead banks to other financial and industrial units, and re-
gional and national governments. This network functions as a system of
early warning and mutual aid. It insures against unexpected changes in
the market, helping companies restructure themselves by shifting their re-
sources internally at the first sign of trouble. The corresponding organiza-
tion of labor is internally flexible, but externally inflexible. Although
wages, benefits, and responsibilities can vary significantly within the com-
pany from one period to the next, employees find it relatively difficult to
leave one company and obtain a new job at another. Employees' fates are
as inextricably linked to the fate of the company as is the fate of the lead
bank. This overall organization of finance and labor, typified by the case
of Toyo Kogyo, strongly favors shifts over shrinkage, internal over exter-
nal redeployment.
At the other extreme, we find companies which have no special ties to
any particular financial institution, and financial institutions which are
similarly fragmented and distanced from one another, from other compa-
nies, and from governments. Most of the financial transactions in this sys-
tem are at arm's length; parties deal with one another on the basis of
information available to them at the time and do not necessarily assume
repeated dealings in the future. Each separate company or institution
takes responsibility. only for its own profitability. The corresponding or-
ganization of labor is internally inflexible, but externally flexible. Wages,
benefits, and responsibilities do not vary significantly within the company
from one period to the next, but employees find it relatively easy to leave
the company. Management and labor deal at arm's length, because they
are presumed to have conflicting agendas. As a result, neither employees
nor financial institutions are especially dependent on the fate of a particu-
lar firm. Furthermore, neither can draw upon a reservoir of trust or rely
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on the discipline of future dealings. This overall organization of finance
and labor, typified by the case of British Leyland, favors shrinkage over
shifts, external over internal redeployment.
Fourth, the government's role in rescuing large failing companies is
likely to be far more visible and targeted when management, finance, and
labor deal with each other at arm's length than when these groups are
more tightly linked. When tightly linked to the firm, both financial and
labor organizations are likely to be actively involved in responding to the
crisis. Government therefore can do its work indirectly through these me-
diating groups. It can act on behalf of affected communities merely by
supporting the financial institutions or the labor organizations which al-
ready have a stake. In contrast, when they are at arm's length from the
firm, neither financial nor labor organizations are necessarily involved in
the crisis. Much of the real burden of redeployment therefore falls on
individuals, some of whom have no direct contractual relationship with
the firm, and on local governments and relief organizations. These indi-
viduals and institutions in turn make political demands for direct govern-
ment intervention to save jobs and communities. The irony, as the BL case
reveals, is that government is able to do little more than slow the pace of
shrinkage without the active cooperation of finance and labor.
Finally, the analysis suggests that the practical question in these cir-
cumstances is not whether the government should intervene to "save jobs,"
but how it might intervene to preserve social networks. The answer to
that question has a great deal to do with how finance and labor are organ-
ized. There are some reasons why internal redeployment might be prefer-
able to external for very large companies whose activities and employment
is concentrated in certain regions. If internal redeployment is preferred,
then centralized planning boards or national development banks, as have
been suggested by some proponents of "industrial policy," '161 may be less
useful than changes in the detailed rules and understandings by which
financial institutions and labor organizations undertake their day-to-day
responsibilities-changes which strengthen the bonds between the com-
pany's workers, managers, and financial institutions.
161. See, e.g., Eizenstat, supra note 5, at 49; Weil, supra note 5, at 981.
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